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INTRODUCTION
Lobbying has a prominent and positive place in our laws and our history. It
is protected by the First Amendment right to petition the government for re-
dress and by similar provisions in numerous state constitutions.' Lobbyists and
the groups they represent often bring useful information to policymakers and
facilitate public participation in, and knowledge about, government decision
making. Indeed, under the consensus definition of lobbying-any attempt to
influence the actions of government-the most successful "lobbyists" include
American heroes such as Patrick Henry, Susan B. Anthony, and Martin Luther
King, Jr.2
Yet lobbying also has a long history as a pejorative term.' The mere men-
tion of Jack Abramoffs name is enough to conjure up images of back-room
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I; John Delvin, Constructing an Alternative to "State Action"
as a Limit on State Constitutional Rights Guarantees, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 819, 828 &
n.38 (199o) (noting that virtually all state bills of rights guarantee the right to peti-
tion the government for redress of grievances, with the exception of Minnesota
and New Mexico).
2. Current scholarship defines "lobbying," at its broadest, as attempting to influence
the actions of any government branch. See, e.g., FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BETH
L. LEECH, BASIC INTERESTS: THE IMPORTANCE OF GROUPS IN POLITICS AND IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE 34 (1998) (noting that seeking to influence the policy process
is the "common thread" for the scholarly definition of lobbying); JEFFREY M.
BERRY & CLYDE WILCOX, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY 6 (4 th ed. 2007) (defin-
ing lobbying in this manner).
3. See, e.g., E. PENDLETON HERRING, GROUP REPRESENTATION BEFORE CONGRESS, at
Vii (1929) (noting that the term "lobby" has "unfortunate connotations" but no
other label so aptly describes the process by which private groups seek to influence
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meetings, illicit campaign contributions, and other shadowy dealings that un-
dermine democracy. 4 The public also has a long-standing belief, whether or not
justified, that lobbyists exert undue influence on public policy, even when their
activities are on the right side of the law.'
Given this widely held suspicion, it is not surprising that over time Con-
gress has imposed a variety of restrictions on lobbying and lobbyists. These re-
strictions include tax rules that increase the cost of lobbying, registration and
disclosure requirements that seek to expose lobbying activities, and limitations
on interactions between government officials and lobbyists.6 But the piecemeal
nature of the legislative process in this area has resulted in the creation of al-
most as many definitions of lobbying as there are statutory provisions that
regulate it.' There are numerous ways to influence government actions, ranging
from suing government agencies to commenting on executive branch rulemak-
ing to urging legislators to propose legislation.' Yet no single existing legal defi-
government action, particularly legislation); Edward B. Logan & Simon N. Patten,
Lobbying, 144 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 1 (Supp. 1 1929) (noting long-
standing public suspicion of "the lobby").
4. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, 109TH CONG., "GIMME FIVE": INVES-
TIGATION OF TRIBAL LOBBYING MATTERS (Comm. Print 2006) (detailing many of
Jack Abramoffs questionable and illegal activities); STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV'T
REFORM, 109TH CONG., STAFF REPORT (2006) (same).
5. See, e.g., Robert C. Byrd, Lobbyists, in 2 THE SENATE, 1789-1989: ADDRESSES ON
THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 491, 492 (Mary Sharon Hall ed.,
1991) (describing the historical suspicion of interest groups engaged in lobbying);
Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis, Introduction: The Changing Nature of Interest
Group Politics, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 1, 3-4 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A.
Loomis eds., 7th ed. 20o6) (same); Press Release, Harris Interactive, Large Majori-
ties of U.S. Adults Believe PACs, Big Companies and Lobbyists Have Too Much
Power and Influence in Washington (Mar. 7, 2007), http://www.harris-
interactive.com/harris-poll/index.asp?PID=737 (reporting that, in a February
2007 poll, seventy-nine percent of respondents felt political lobbyists had too
much influence on government policy, politicians, and policymakers in Washing-
ton).
6. See infra Section I.A.
7. See infra Section I.B. The various laws do not necessarily use the specific term
"lobbying." See infra note 89. But all of the activities that they regulate can be
viewed as lobbying in the broadest sense, so for the sake of simplicity that term
will be used throughout this Article.
8. The breadth of possible advocacy activities has been well documented since at
least the early part of the twentieth century. See, e.g., HERRING, supra note 3, at 59-
77 (describing the various tactics used by interest groups in the early twentieth
century); Logan & Patten, supra note 3, at 52-65 (same).
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nition of lobbying encompasses the entire range of these activities, and each
covers a different, although often overlapping, subset.9
The question raised by this divergence is whether these varying definitions
further the purposes for the existing restrictions on lobbying or whether a sin-
gle, uniform definition would better serve those purposes. A related question is
what the definition, or definitions, should be to ensure that these purposes are
furthered. Previous scholarship in this area has primarily focused on the legal
rules, addressing the definition of lobbying only briefly.' It has also tended to
9. See infra Section I.B. Historically, lobbying has tended to be defined at its broadest
as any attempt to influence legislation, as evidenced by its apparent origin as a ref-
erence to the lobbies of legislative buildings where those seeking to influence legis-
lation gathered. See BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 2, at 33-36 (describing the
origin of the term "lobbying" and the various definitions of lobbying used in
scholarship) (1998); BERRY & WILCOX, supra note 2, at 6 (describing the origin of
the term "lobbying"); see also United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 47 (1953) (in
part because of constitutional concerns, defining the phrase "lobbying activities"
in a congressional resolution as only reaching "lobbying in its commonly accepted
sense, that is, representations made directly to the Congress, its members, or its
committees" as opposed to attempts to influence public opinion); Logan & Patten,
supra note 3, at 3 (identifying the broadest definition of lobbying as "attempt[ing]
to influence legislation in any way whatsoever"). But more contemporary scholar-
ship tends to define "lobbying," at its broadest, as attempting to influence the ac-
tions of any government branch. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
io. See, e.g., Laura B. Chisolm, Exempt Organization Advocacy: Matching the Rules to
the Rationales, 63 IND. L. REV. 201, 297 (1987) (as part of recommendations for re-
vising the tax rules governing lobbying by organizations described in I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3), proposing a narrower definition of "legislative activity"); Jasper L.
Cummings, Tax Policy, Social Policy, and Politics: Amending Section 162(e), 9 Ex-
EMPT ORG. TAX REV. 137, 149 (1994) (concluding that Congress's decision to deny
a business expense deduction for lobbying expenditures may have been reason-
able, without discussing whether Congress should have revisited the definition of
lobbying); Vincent R. Johnson, Regulating Lobbyists: Law, Ethics, and Public Pol-
icy, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 51-52 (2006) (noting the difficulties that com-
plex definitions of "lobbying" create, but not discussing possible solutions); Anita
S. Krishnakumar, Towards a Madisonian, Interest-Group-Based, Approach to Lob-
bying Regulation, 58 ALA. L. REV. 513, 545-58 (2007) (proposing various changes to
rules governing disclosure of lobbying but generally not discussing the definition
of lobbying except to argue for including grassroots lobbying within the reach of
the disclosure rules); William V. Luneburg & Thomas M. Susman, Lobbying Dis-
closure: A Recipe for Reform, 33 J. LEGIS. 32, 43-56 (2006) (same, and also arguing
for the elimination of the ability to use certain tax definitions of lobbying for pur-
poses of the disclosure rules); Elizabeth J. Reid, Understanding the Word "Advo-
cacy": Context and Use, in (1 STRUCTURING THE INQUIRY INTO ADVOCACY] NON-
PROFIT ADVOCACY AND THE POLICY PROCESS 1, 6-7 (Elizabeth J. Reid ed., 2000),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/structuring.pdf (briefly discussing the diffi-
culty of defining both advocacy generally and lobbying specifically, but without
proposing a definitive definition of either term). But see Miriam Galston, Lobby-
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focus on a particular set of rules rather than a comprehensive review of the reg-
ulation of lobbying and lobbyists." This Article fills this gap by focusing on the
definition of lobbying in the context of all of the generally applicable federal
rules. This approach-looking comprehensively at all the legal rules governing a
particular activity in light of the most current research on that activity instead
of at a particular law or set of laws-could be productively applied to numerous
other types of activities."
Part I of this Article reviews the current federal laws governing lobbying,
describing the restrictions imposed by those laws, the reasons for those restric-
tions, and the various definitions of lobbying used by each set of rules. These
laws include various tax provisions, the Lobbying Disclosure Act, and the ethics
laws and rules covering both members of Congress and executive branch offi-
cials. This Part concludes that, despite the varied histories of these laws, they
share a common underlying justification: concern that interest groups will un-
duly influence government actions to the detriment of the overall public inter-
est. Part II then draws on the extensive legal and non-legal literature exploring
interactions between interest groups and government officials. While much
about how interest groups influence government remains unclear, Part II con-
cludes that the means of exercising such influence vary significantly depending
on what type of government actor is the target of the advocacy effort as opposed
to what type of government action is desired. Part II also notes that not all in-
terest group influence is actually or potentially detrimental, and so not all inter-
est group efforts should be subject to the rules described in Part I.
Finally, Part III proposes that Congress adopt in most instances a single de-
finition of lobbying for all of the relevant rules, a definition that focuses on the
type of government actor whom interest groups are seeking to influence. The
covered government actors would include officials and employees of the
legislative branch, and also the most senior officials and employees of the ex-
ecutive branch. This definition would be better than the existing multiple defi-
ing and the Public Interest: Rethinking the Internal Revenue Code's Treatment of
Legislative Activities, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1269, 1340-43 (1993) (proposing, for purposes
of the tax rules governing lobbying, dividing lobbying into two categories, "educa-
tional advocacy lobbying," which would be allowed without limit for tax-exempt
organizations and be deductible for businesses, and all other attempts to influence
lawmakers, which would be prohibited for tax-exempt organizations and not de-
ductible for businesses).
11. See, e.g., Chisolm, supra note io (focusing on the tax rules); Galston, supra note io
(focusing on the tax rules); Johnson, supra note io (focusing on the disclosure and
lobbyist rules); Krishnakumar, supra note io (focusing on the disclosure rules);
Luneburg & Susman, supra note io (focusing on the disclosure rules).
12. See, e.g., JOHN COPELAND NAGLE, LAW'S ENVIRONMENT: How ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AFFECTS THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT (forthcoming 2008) (exploring how
the entire universe of applicable federal and state environmental laws together af-
fect the use of particular properties or environmental resources).
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nitions of lobbying for two main reasons. First, it would provide a better match
than the existing definitions with the shared common purpose of the various
federal laws relating to lobbying, which is to limit the influence of interest
groups on government actions when that influence is likely to be detrimental to
the overall public interest. Second, the adoption of a single definition of lobby-
ing would increase the effectiveness of those laws by simplifying compliance
and enforcement. The definition would not, however, reach "grassroots" lobby-
ing efforts-i.e., attempts to influence the public to contact government ac-
tors-because such attempts are both less as likely to result in government ac-
tions contrary to the public interest and may provide significant benefits.
By focusing solely on the definition of lobbying, this Article necessarily
does not explore certain related topics. It does not weigh the constitutional or
public policy merits of the existing restrictions, but rather takes these restric-
tions as a given. 3 It also focuses on federal laws, although the analysis is also ap-
plicable to state laws governing lobbying. It does not cover laws relating to more
specific situations, such as restrictions on using federal grants funds for lobby-
ing, 4 restrictions on federally created or chartered organizations engaging in
lobbying, 5 or the additional registration and reporting requirements for indi-
13. See sources cited supra note io.
14. E.g., 7 U.S.C.A. § 20o8j (West 2007); 7 U.S.C. § 6005, 7444 (2000); 16 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1166, 3709 (West 2007); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1913 (West 2007); 25 U.S.C. § 64od-29
(2000); 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 1352, 5134 (West 2007); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2996f, 10410, 1o6o3b,
10706, 13014, 13925 (West 2007); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-9, 300j-1, 4368 (2000); 49
U.S.C.A. §§ 60114, 60130, 60134 (West 2007). A related issue is whether Congress
can bar federal grant recipients from using any funds, whether from federal or
other sources, to engage in lobbying. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C.A. § 1611 (West 2005) (bar-
ring organizations that are tax-exempt under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4) and engage in
lobbying activities from being eligible for federal awards, grants, or loans); Re-
bekah Diller, Efforts To Restrict the Advocacy Rights of Nonprofits That Partner with
Government, 9 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 315 (20o6); Timothy C. Layton, Note, Welfare for
Lobbyists or Nonprofit Gag Rule: Can Congress Limit a Federal Grant Recipient's
Use of Private Funds for Political Advocacy?, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1065 (1977); Amy
E. Moody, Note, Conditional Federal Grants: Can the Government Undercut Lobby-
ing by Nonprofits Through Conditions Placed on Federal Grants?, 24 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 113 (1996).
15. E.g., 6 U.S.C.A. § 311 (West 2007) (Home Security Organization and FEMA); 7
U.S.C. § 3405 (2000) (Wheat Industry Council); 12 U.S.C.A. § 17oy (West 2007)
(National Homeownership Foundation); 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852 (West 2007) (regional
Fishery Management Councils); 16 U.S.C. § 5807 (2000) (National Natural Re-
sources Conservation Foundation); 20 U.S.C.A. § 4353 (West 2007) (Galludet
University and the National Technical Institute for the Deaf); 22 U.S.C. § 4604
(2000) (United States Institute of Peace); 36 U.S.C.A. §§ 201o6 (Agricultural Hall
of Fame), 20707 (American Council of Learned Societies), 20908 (American Ex-
Prisoners of War), 22907 (Army and Navy Union of the United States of Amer-
ica), 23106 (Aviation Hall of Fame), 405o6 (Congressional Medal of Honor Society
of the United States of America), 50107 (Daughters of Union Veterans of the Civil
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viduals and entities who lobby on behalf of foreign governments,'6 since each of
those situations raise issues that do not apply to the more general laws govern-
ing lobbying. 7 Finally, this Article will only occasionally refer to the rules and
definitions governing campaign contributions or independent communications
meant to influence an election. Such activities are governed by a separate set of
more restrictive rules supported in significant part by different concerns than
those that underlie the laws governing lobbying generally."
War 1861-1865), 60107 (82nd Airborne Division Association), 70307 (Former
Members of Congress), 70507 (Foundation of the Federal Bar Association), 80507
(Gold Star Wives of America), 100107 (Italian American War Veterans of the
United States), 150108 (National Academy of Public Administration), 151507 (Na-
tional Federation of Music Clubs), 152107 (National Mining Hall of Fame and
Museum), 152707 (National Ski Patrol System), 152908 (National Society, Daugh-
ters of the American Colonists), 154507 (Navy Wives Clubs of America), 170308
(Pearl Harbor Survivors Association), 170507 (Polish Legion of American Veter-
ans, U.S.A.), 210308 (369 th Veterans' Association), 220108 (United Service Or-
ganizations), 220707 (United States Submarine Veterans of World War II), 240107
(Women's Army Corps Veterans' Association) (West 2007); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2996e
(Legal Services Corporation), 9843a (Head Start), 10707 (State Justice Institute),
12664 (Points of Light Foundation) (West 2007).
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 219 (2000); 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 611-621 (West 2007). See generally
Charles Lawson, Note, Shining the "Spotlight of Pitiless Publicity" on Foreign Lob-
byists? Evaluating the Impact of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 on the Foreign
Agents Registration Act, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1151 (1996).
17. These other issues include whether organizations that have close ties to the federal
government through government grants or federal chartering should be permitted
to lobby that government even though they are in some respects extensions of
that government and likely strongly influenced by government officials and the
extent to which either national security concerns or other possible threats require
foreign governments seeking to influence U.S. government actions to fully dis-
close their activities in this regard.
18. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2007) (distinguishing speech
relating to the election of public officials from speech relating to issues of general
public interest but noting that making this distinction is often difficult); First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978) (distinguishing be-
tween speech relating to election of public officials and speech relating to general
public interest). See generally Lloyd H. Mayer, The Much Maligned 527 and Institu-
tional Choice, 87 B.U. L. REV. 625, 630-48 (2007) (summarizing the federal election
and tax laws governing election-related activity).
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I. CURRENT LAW
Congress's ability to regulate lobbying is constitutionally limited.'9 While
the exact parameters of this limit are not completely known, the Supreme Court
has held that Congress cannot prohibit individuals or entities, including corpo-
rations, from expending funds on speech aimed at influencing government ac-
tions in most instances.2" This constitutional protection extends to both direct
contacts with government officials and indirect attempts to influence govern-
ment actions by urging the public to contact government officials, commonly
known as grassroots lobbying.21
Although lobbying therefore enjoys significant constitutional protection,
policymakers have long been concerned about reducing its possible nefarious
effects." James Madison feared that subsets of citizens united by common pas-
sions or interests would form organizations-or interest groups-to pursue
government action (or inaction) that furthered their own interests but were ad-
verse to the overall public interest. This worry about lobbying continued into
19. See generally Andrew P. Thomas, Easing the Pressure on Pressure Groups: Toward a
Constitutional Right To Lobby, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 149, 158-72 (1993) (re-
viewing cases addressing the extent of First Amendment protections relating to
lobbying); Meredith A. Capps, Note, "Gouging the Government": Why a Federal
Contingency Fee Lobbying Prohibition Is Consistent with First Amendment Free-
doms, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1885, 1899-1915 (2005) (same).
20. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784 (concluding that First Amendment speech protections
apply regardless of whether the speaker is an individual or a corporation).
21. See Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2671-73 (rejecting as unconstitutional an attempt
to prevent the use by a nonprofit corporation of its treasury funds to engage in
what was arguably grassroots lobbying, even though the nonprofit corporation
had other, albeit more burdensome, avenues for engaging in the speech at issue);
BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 525 (2002) (noting that the First
Amendment's right to petition protects attempts to influence directly the actions
of any of the branches of government).
22. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. lo (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at
323-24 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (describing this concern but
noting that the existence of a multiplicity of interests works against it).
23. See THE FEDERALIST No. io, at 77-78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); cf HERRING, supra note 3, at 241-42 (concluding that the development of
organized groups of citizens tended to lead to the elevation of a particular group's
interest over the national welfare). While Madison was primarily concerned about
the influence of a faction that constituted a majority, having concluded that lesser
factions would fail in the face of majority opposition under the governmental
structure established by the Constitution and the multiplicity of interests existing
in the United States, it is now well recognized that even factions that are a minor-
ity may be able to achieve their desired governmental action, possibly to the det-
riment of the majority of citizens and the public interest, because of the difficul-
ties of organizing majority opposition when the detriment is small for each citizen
492
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the second half of the nineteenth century, as illustrated by a series of Supreme
Court decisions that found contingency fee lobbying contracts void on public
policy grounds because of the risks of corruption and other forms of improper
influence such contracts allegedly created? 4
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Congress began to pass measures
specifically designed to curb perceived undue influence of interest groups. Con-
gress has found three ways to regulate lobbying that have avoided successful
First Amendment challenge. Section A briefly describes these legal rules, review-
ing both their historical origins and the justifications that have allowed them to
survive, and concludes that a common purpose now unites them: limiting the
influence of interest groups. Section B explores how, despite this common pur-
pose, the definition of lobbying varies among, and even within, these three sets
of rules.
A. "Lobbying" Regulated
One way Congress regulates lobbying is to increase its cost by barring indi-
viduals and entities from deducting lobbying expenditures in most instances.2 5
A second way is to require public disclosure of information about lobbying ac-
tivities and sources of funds for lobbying, although the exact extent of disclo-
sure that Congress may constitutionally require remains uncertain. 6 Third, and
in the majority. See THE FEDERALIST No. io, at 80 (James Madison), No. 51, at
323-25 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See generally MANCUR OLSON
JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS (1965) (developing the still dominant theory of how organizational costs
associated with forming groups, including free rider concerns, can lead to rela-
tively small groups that can effectively achieve their goals; Olson published a re-
vised version of this book in 1971 under the same title).
24. See, e.g., Hazelton v. Sheckells, 202 U.S. 71, 79 (1906) (declaring void a contingency
fee contract for lobbying because such contracts tend to induce improper solicita-
tions of government officials); Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 441, 449-52 (1874)
(same); Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 335-36
(1853) (same); see also Providence Tool Co. v. Norris, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 45, 54-56
(1864) (applying the same reasoning to void a contingency fee contract relating to
procuring a government contract from an executive branch official).
25. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (re-
jecting both First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause challenges to the pro-
hibition against substantial lobbying by organizations described in I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3)); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 512-13 (1959) (rejecting a
First Amendment challenge to the denial of a business expense deduction for ex-
penditures incurred to oppose ballot initiatives).
26. See Krishnakumar, supra note 1o, at 562-65 (reviewing the existing case law re-
garding the constitutional limits on Congress's authority to require disclosure of
lobbying activities); Luneburg & Susman, supra note lo, at 35-39 (same). See gen-
erally Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Ano-
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finally, Congress restricts interactions between government officials and lobby-
ists that go beyond mere speech.2 7 Such restrictions include not only prohibiting
outright bribery but also placing limitations on gifts and travel that government
officials may receive and placing restrictions on former government officials
engaging in lobbying.2"
1. Taxing Lobbying
Why are there tax rules for lobbying? Because lobbying requires spending
money, and when money is spent, there is always the question of how to treat
those expenditures for tax purposes. The money in lobbying is provided by in-
terest groups that hire outside paid lobbyists, direct their own paid staffs to en-
gage in lobbying, or pay for communications to either government actors or the
public in a bid to influence government actions.2 9 Even if an interest group re-
lies primarily on unpaid volunteers to visit with their legislators, such activities
still require funding to pay for travel and lodging expenses, pre-visit meeting
rooms, written materials to be left behind, and the like. So it is not surprising
that the first regulation of lobbying by the federal government occurred in the
tax laws, when the Treasury Department faced the issue of whether lobbying
expenditures could be deducted as ordinary and necessary business expenses.
Initially, Congress's reasons for enacting the tax restrictions focused less on
concerns about interest group influence and more on ensuring equal treatment
of citizens seeking to influence government action, whether embodied in legis-
Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537 (2007) (discussing the extent of
constitutional protection for anonymous speech).
27. These limitations have generally not been subject to constitutional challenge in
the courts, which is perhaps not surprising given that, with the exception of the
anti-bribery statutes, most of them have been implemented by placing restrictions
and imposing penalties only on the government officials involved, not the lobby-
ists.
28. See infra Subsection I.A.3.
29. See BERRY & WILCOX, supra note 2, at 14-15 (noting that Americans tend to view
lobbying by interest groups as the primary source of government problems);
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991); John-
son, supra note 1O, at 8-9 (noting that lobbyists, by definition, are paid to act on
behalf of others); Krishnakumar, supra note io, at 542 (noting that ultimately the
public's concerns about lobbyists are driven by concerns about the influence of
the interest groups that pay to employ them); see also Edward J. McCaffery &
Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The New Logic of Collective Action, 84
N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1196 (2006) (noting that lobbyists represent interest groups but
also "shake down" those same groups by charging them fees and are in turn
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lation or other government acts." But most recently its focus has been more on
the possible negative effects of interest group influence and less on equal treat-
ment.
Current law increases the cost of lobbying by almost always requiring indi-
viduals and entities to use after-tax dollars to pay for lobbying." By denying a
deduction for such expenditures, Congress effectively requires taxpayers to pay
tax on the funds they use for lobbying.32 The mechanism Congress uses to ac-
complish this goal is the denial, for the most part, of a deduction for lobbying
expenditures even if the lobbying expenditures would otherwise qualify as "or-
dinary and necessary" business expenses.3 In addition, federal tax law bars oth-
erwise qualified organizations from being eligible to receive tax-deductible cha-
ritable contributions if the organization engages in lobbying as a substantial
part of its activities.3 4 Tax law also prohibits private foundations from spending
30. This goal is presumably based on seeking to make real a pluralist vision of democ-
racy, where all members of society have sufficient interest group representation.
See BERRY & WILCOX, supra note 2, at ii (describing attempts to make the pluralist
vision of politics a reality by supporting the formation of interest groups for the
previously disenfranchised and underrepresented).
31. For a more detailed overview of the tax rules governing lobbying, see Judith E.
Kindell & John Francis Reilly, Lobbying Issues, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS-
TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 1997, at 261 (1997), http://www.irs.
gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicp97.pdf.
32. See Gregg D. Polsky, A Tax Lawyer's Perspective on Section 527 Organizations, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1773, 1775-78 (2007) (explaining how Congress uses a similar
mechanism to require the use of after-tax dollars with respect to election-related
activities).
33. I.R.C. § 162(e) (2000); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-2o(c)(5), 1.162-28(a)(1) (as amended in
1995). Other tax provisions bar attempts to avoid this non-deductibility rule
through paying dues or making contributions to tax-exempt organizations that
lobby. I.R.C. §§ 162(e)(3), 170(f)(9), 6033(e) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(d) (as
amended in 1995); John Francis Reilly & Barbara A. Braig Allen, Political Cam-
paign and Lobbying Activities of IRC 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) Organizations, in
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS-TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 2003, at
L-I, L-19 to L-52 (2002), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopiclo3.pdf (explain-
ing the operation of I.R.C. §§ 162(e), 6033(e)).
34. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) (2000) (denying a charitable contribution deduction if
the recipient is disqualified for tax exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) by reason
of attempting to influence legislation); id. § 501(c)(3) (2000) (denying tax exemp-
tion if an otherwise eligible organization has attempting to influence legislation as
a substantial part of its activities); Treas. Reg. § 1.17OA-1(j)(5)(i) (as amended in
2005) (echoing I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) and denying a charitable contribution de-
duction for any lobbying expenditures); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3)(i), -
1(b)(3)(iii), -1(c)(3)(ii), -1(c)(3)(iv) (as amended in 199o) (interpreting I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) as also prohibiting tax exemption under that provision if the otherwise
charitable organization has as a main or primary objective that is only attainable
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any funds on lobbying, subject to a few narrow exceptions discussed below. 5 As
detailed immediately below, the rationale for this tax treatment has not always
been clear but in recent years Congress has indicated it is now driven primarily
by concerns about the undue influence of interest groups.
a. Lobbying as a Business Activity
The tax rule regarding deducting lobbying expenditures as a business ex-
pense came first historically, and so it is appropriate to start with how the rea-
sons for this rule's enactment have evolved over time. Establishing what re-
mained the rule for almost fifty years, the Treasury Department issued a ruling
in 1915 that denied deductibility for lobbying expenditures simply because they
were not "an ordinary and necessary expense in the operation and maintenance
of a business." 6 The first set of decisions by the Board of Tax Appeals, the pre-
decessor to today's Tax Court, picked up on this rationale by adopting a case-
by the passage or defeat of legislation); Rev. Rul. 80-275, 1980-2 C.B. 69 (denying a
charitable contribution deduction for a contribution earmarked for use in in-
fluencing specific legislation). Such organizations are, however, generally able to
receive deductible contributions if they engage in lobbying as only an insubstantial
part of their activities, including if they elect to be subject to a sliding scale system
that allows some smaller organizations described in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) to spend up
to twenty percent of their budgets on lobbying. See I.R.C. § 5o1(h) (providing for
this election) (2000); id. § 4911(c)(2) (providing a sliding scale, beginning at twen-
ty percent, for permitted lobbying expenditures).
35. See I.R.C. § 507 (2000) (terminating private foundation status and imposing a tax
equal to the lesser of the tax benefit received by donors to the foundation and the
foundation as a result of its I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) status or the value of the founda-
tion's net assets for willful repeated violations or a single willful and flagrant viola-
tion of, among other rules, the prohibition on lobbying); id. § 4945(a), (b), (d)(1)
(imposing an excise tax on and requiring the correction of any private foundation
expenditures for attempting to influence legislation). Private foundations are cha-
ritable organizations that rely on financial support from a small group of donors
or from investments. See I.R.C. § 509(a) (2000) (defining the term "private foun-
dation").
36. T.D. 2137, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 57, 57-58 (1915); see also I.T. 2290, 5-1 C.B. 53, 53-
55 (1926) (denying a deduction for a contribution to a chamber of commerce to
cover expenses related to obtaining a revision of freight rates from the Interstate
Commerce Commission for the same reason). The Treasury Department shortly
thereafter promulgated a regulation denying a deduction for lobbying expendi-
tures. Treas. Reg. § 33, art. 143 (1918), reprinted in 132 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1909-1950: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS, AND ADMINIS-
TRATIVE DOCUMENTS 75 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979).
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by-case approach to the question of deductibility, focusing on whether expenses
related to influencing government action were in fact ordinary and necessary. 7
The executive branch abandoned this rationale, however, in later litigation.
It argued-and the courts agreed-that the potential harm lobbying inflicted
on the legislative process provided a public policy justification for disfavoring
compensation." In reaching this conclusion in 1941, the Supreme Court noted
that its line of cases voiding contingency fee lobbying contracts as against public
policy provided sufficient grounds for the Treasury Department to exclude lob-
bying expenses from deductible business expenses on public policy grounds.3 9
This line of reasoning for this rule then shifted subtly, albeit temporarily, in
1958, when the Supreme Court again visited this issue. The shift arose out of the
related tax provisions applicable to charities.4 In 1930, Judge Learned Hand had
found contributions to a purported charity were not deductible because the re-
cipient organization engaged in lobbying--seeking the repeal of laws preventing
birth control-as a more than incidental activity.4' He reasoned that to allow a
deduction to such an organization would necessarily provide government sup-
port for the lobbying effort, which the Treasury must avoid.42 Relying on this
reasoning in the face of a constitutional challenge to the denial of a business de-
duction rule, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge on the ground that
businesses "are simply being required to pay for those [lobbying] activities en-
37. E.g., Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Comm'r, 38 B.T.A. 623, 630-31 (1938), rev'd en banc,
117 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1940), afj'd, 314 U.S. 326 (1941); Old Mission P. Cement Co. v.
Comm'r, 25 B.T.A. 305, 320 (1932), affd in part, rev'd in part, 69 F.2d 676, 681 (9 th
Cir. 1934) (affirming the denial of a lobbying expenditure deduction because the
outlay was not an ordinary and necessary business expense), affd, 293 U.S. 289
(1934); Los Angeles & Salt Lake Ry. Co. v. Comm'r, 18 B.T.A. 168, 179 (1929). See
generally Dean E. Sharp, Reflection on the Disallowance of Income Tax Deductions
for Lobbying Expenditures, 39 B.U. L. REV. 365, 366-79 (1969) (reviewing the treat-
ment of this rule by the courts over time).
38. E.g., Textile Mills, 314 U.S. at 338-39; see also Comm'r v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467,
473 (1943) (giving this rule as one example of rules adopted to support a sharply
defined public policy). See generally Note, Tax Treatment of Lobbying Expenses and
Contributions, 67 HARv. L. REV. 14o8, 1414-15 (1954) (discussing Textile Mills).
39. Textile Mills, 314 U.S. at 338-39.
40. For purposes of this Article, the term "charities" will be used to refer to organiza-
tions that qualify for tax-exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). I use this
term only in the tax, as opposed to lay, sense, in that by virtue of this status such
organizations are eligible to receive deductible "charitable" contributions under
I.R.C. § 170(a), (c)(2) (2000).
41. Slee v. Comm'r, 42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930).
42. Id. ("Political agitation as such is outside the statute, however innocent the aim,
though it adds nothing to dub it 'propaganda,' a polemical word used to decry the
publicity of the other side. Controversies of that sort must be conducted without
public subvention; the Treasury stands aside from them.").
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tirely out of their own pockets, as everyone else engaging in similar activities is
required to do .. .41
The problem with this shift in rationale is that it has a fatal flaw. Businesses
are routinely permitted to deduct expenses relating to their business activities,
expenses that individuals are not permitted to deduct if such expenses are for
their personal purposes.44 For example, if a business purchases advertising for
its products, that cost is deductible to the business, but if an individual buys ad-
vertising for non-business reasons (e.g., a personals ad), that cost is not de-
ductible. Why? Because the business's cost is one that is incurred to generate
income and denying the business a deduction would lead to an inflated amount
of income being subject to tax. Carried to its logical extreme, a denial of a de-
duction for business expenses would transform the income tax into a gross re-
ceipts tax for businesses.
Congress recognized this flaw in 1962, when it concluded that a business
deduction should be permitted for business-related lobbying expenses because
such a deduction "is necessary to arrive at a true reflection of [a business's] real
income for tax purposes." 45 In the first statute explicitly addressing this issue,
Congress permitted businesses to deduct lobbying expenses that were of "direct
interest" to the business.46 Congress also felt that permitting such a deduction
would improve the flow of information to members of Congress, would reduce
the administrative burden on businesses, and would eliminate the disparity be-
tween the treatment of lobbying expenditures-then defined in a way that lim-
ited lobbying to seeking to influence legislation-and expenditures that at-
tempted to influence other types of government actions. 4 As detailed below,
however, Congress did not extend this deductibility to expenditures for grass-
43. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 533 (1959). The Court also relied heav-
ily on the reenactment doctrine, noting that Congress had repeatedly reenacted
the underlying statute over a more than forty-year period without altering the
Treasury Department's regulatory interpretation of it in this area. Id. at 531-32.
44. See Note, Deductibility of Expenses To Influence Legislation, 46 VA. L. REV. 112, 119-
20 (1960) (discussing the point as part of an analysis of the Cammarano decision).
Compare I.R.C. § 162(a) (2ooo) (permitting a deduction for ordinary and neces-
sary business expenses), with I.R.C. § 262 (2000) (generally denying a deduction
for personal, living, or family expenses).
45. H.R. REP. No. 87-1447, at 17 (1962); see also S. REP. No. 87-1881, at 23-24 (1962)
(same language); Shannon King, Note, The Lobbying Deduction Disallowance: Pol-
icy Considerations, Comparisons, and Structuring Activities Under Amended Section
162(e), 15 VA. TAX REV. 551, 581 (1996) (explaining the net income rationale for
permitting a deduction for business-related lobbying expenses).
46. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 3, 76 Stat. 96o, 973 (1962) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 162(e)).
47. H.R. REP. No. 87-1447, at 17 (1962); S. REP. No. 87-1881, at 24 (1962).
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roots lobbying (defined as attempts to influence legislation by appealing to the
public).48
This limited allowance of a business deduction for lobbying expenditures
remained the rule for over thirty years. But in the early 199os, the Clinton Ad-
ministration proposed to reverse course and to deny any business deduction for
lobbying expenses. 49 The stated reason brought concerns about interest group
influence to the fore again: "[tihe deduction for lobbying expenses inappropri-
ately benefits corporations and special interest groups for intervening in the leg-
islative process."5 Congress acquiesced to this proposal.' Once again, the
dominant reason for this tax rule became limiting the perceived undue influ-
ence of interest groups as opposed to ensuring equal treatment of all attempts
to influence government action.
b. Lobbying as a Charitable Activity
In contrast to the shifting business expenses deduction rule, the rule for
charities has remained essentially the same since 1934, when Congress codified
the requirement that charities not engage in lobbying as a "substantial part" of
their activities.52 Whether Congress was directly influenced by Judge Hand's
48. See infra Subsection I.C.3.
49. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, SUMMARY OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S REVENUE PRO-
POSALS 45 (1993).
50. Id.; see also WILLIAM CLINTON & ALBERT GORE, PUTTING PEOPLE FIRST: How WE
CAN ALL CHANGE AMERICA 25 (1992) (proposing the elimination of the tax de-
duction for "special interest lobbying expenses" in order "[tlo help put govern-
ment back in the hands of the people").
51. The written congressional history only reflects a concern about raising additional
revenues. H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 659 (1993). But Congress was almost certainly
aware of the Administration's publicly stated concerns. See King, supra note 45, at
583 (concluding, even given the lack of clear legislative history, that Congress
seems to have been trying to discourage lobbying by making business-related lob-
bying expenditures non-deductible); sources cited supra notes 49-50.
52. Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 74-216, § 23(0), 48 Stat. 680, 690 (1934); see also
id. §§ 1(6), 4o6, 517, 48 Stat. at 700, 755, 760 (including the same restriction on a
charity's tax exemption and eligibility to receive contributions exempted from the
estate and gift taxes); Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-407, § 102(c), 49 Stat.
1014, 1o16 (1935) (incorporating the same requirement into the charitable contri-
bution deduction provision for corporations); I.R.C. § 17o(c)(2)(D) (2000) (cur-
rent law).
Prior to the 1934 statute, the Treasury Department had issued a regulation
stating that disseminating controversial or partisan propaganda was not "educa-
tional" within the meaning of the charitable contribution deduction statute, pos-
sibly out of concern about the growing influence of interest groups. See T.D. 2831,
21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 285 (1919); Tommy F. Thompson, The Availability of the
Federal Educational Tax Exemption for Propaganda Organizations, 18 U.C. DAVIS
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reasoning in Slee is unclear, but the record indicates that the Senate Finance
Committee added the "no substantial part" lobbying restriction because it was
worried that, absent this limitation, a donor with selfish legislative ends might
inappropriately receive a charitable contribution deduction if the recipient
charity engaged in a significant amount of lobbying. 53 According to a detailed
analysis by Professor Oliver Houck, this concern was not merely an abstract
one, as Senator Reed, the ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee
who appears to have played a critical role in passage of the rule, had some spe-
cific charities and donors in mind. 4 Indeed, the legislative history indicates that
the Committee recognized the added language was broader than necessary to
accomplish its goal, but it could not apparently draft any narrower language
that still accomplished its purpose.5 Despite this (very limited) history, the
breadth of the actual statutory language has led IRS commentators to conclude
that the provision may have been enacted "simply because there was a general
sentiment that lobbying by charities should be restricted." 6 Even though the
restriction on charities has now been in place for over seventy years, Congress
has never more fully elaborated on the reasons for its existence. The closest
Congress came was in 1987, when the House Subcommittee on Oversight cryp-
L. REV. 487, 536-37 (1985) (noting that Treasury's regulation coincided with the
rise of organized interest groups following World War I). The only significant
change since the initial statutory enactment has been the addition of an elective
sliding scale regime. See supra note 34. While significant as a practical matter, this
change did not disturb the general rule that charities can only engage in a limited
amount of lobbying.
53. 78 CONG. REC. 5861, 5959 (1934) (statement of Senator David Reed). Senator David
Reed was the ranking minority member of the Committee and made this com-
ment during a colloquy with Senator Pat Harrison, the Chairman of the Commit-
tee. See SENATE FIN. COMM., HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, S. Doc.
No. 97-5, at 140 (1981) (listing the members of the Committee in 1934).
54. Oliver A. Houck, On the Limits of Charity: Lobbying, Litigation, and Electoral Poli-
tics by Charitable Organizations Under the Internal Revenue Code and Related
Laws, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 16-23 (2003) (detailing Senator Reed's long running
battle with the National Economy League over veteran's benefits and his citing of
it as the prime example for why the lobbying restriction on charities should be en-
acted); see also William J. Lehrfeld, The Taxation of Ideology, 19 CATH. U. L. REV.
50, 63-64 (1969) (reaching the same conclusion).
55. 78 CONG. REC. 5861, 5959 (1934). For additional speculation about the reasons be-
hind the restriction and its perhaps unintended consequences, see Chisolm, supra
note lo, at 222-23 n.log; Elias Clark, The Limitation on Political Activities: A Dis-
cordant Note in the Law of Charities, 46 VA. L. REV. 439, 447-48 (1960); and Myron
Walker & Tim Rothermel, Note, Political Activity and Tax Exempt Organizations
Before and After the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1114, 1118
(1969).
56. Kindell & Reilly, supra note 31, at 265.
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tically stated its belief that the restriction "continue[s] to represent sound tax
policy."57
The legislative history for the enactment of the prohibition on private
foundations engaging in lobbying does, however, hint at why Congress main-
tains the limitation on lobbying by charities. The prohibition on private foun-
dation lobbying was part of a larger body of restrictions targeted at private
foundations. 5' The legislative history for those restrictions indicates that the
lobbying prohibition arose out of concern that private foundations had been
using more and more of their wealth to influence legislation, both directly and
through grassroots lobbying, and that the existing limitation on lobbying by
charities was not sufficiently limiting these efforts. 59 While the legislative history
is sparse, it strongly indicates that both the current general denial of a business
expenses deduction for lobbying expenses and the limitations on charities en-
gaging in lobbying are at least currently based on a common concern that if
these restrictions did not exist, the affected entities would wield undue influ-
ence with respect to government actions. Concerns about treating all attempts,
by all types of groups, to influence government action equally have faded to the
extent they ever had much weight.
2. Disclosing Lobbying
Congress has not, however, limited itself to providing adverse tax rules for
lobbying expenditures. It has also enacted the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995
(LDA), which requires "lobbyists" that lobby certain federal government offi-
cials to register and report on their lobbying activities.6" Lobbyists are either in-
57. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF THE WAYS AND MEANS COMM., REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON LOBBYING AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES BY TAX-
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. lOO-12, at 37 (1987).
58. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, 513-540 (1969).
59. H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 4, 19-43 (1969); S. REP. No. 91-552, at 6, 25-62 (1969); see
also THOMAS A. TROYER, THE 1969 PRIVATE FOUNDATION LAW 20 & n.55 (2000)
(noting that certain controversial grants by the Ford Foundation, including ones
relating to school decentralization, appear to have provided support for the 1969
prohibition on private foundations engaging in lobbying); Walker & Rothermel,
supra note 55, at 1127-29 (discussing the background of the 1969 prohibition). See
generally Jeffrey M. Berry, Ensuring Nonprofit Passivity 16-17 (Sept. 1-4, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript, http://ase.tufts.edu/polsci/faculty/berry/paper-np-
passivity.pdf) (concluding that concerns about the negative effects of interest
groups on democratic politics drives the limits on political involvement by chari-
ties).
60. 2 U.S.C. §§ 16o1-1612 (2000). See generally CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LOBBYING
CONGRESS: AN OVERVIEW OF LEGAL PROVISIONS AND CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS
RULES 2-5 (2006) (describing the LDA). There has not been any court decision
addressing a constitutional challenge to the LDA, but the Supreme Court found
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dividuals or organizations that are hired by a client to engage in lobbying, or
individuals or organizations that lobby on their own behalf.61 Lobbyists, or the
organizations that employ them, are required to provide identifying and contact
information for both themselves and their clients, to identify the chamber of
Congress and the specific federal agencies contacted on behalf of clients, to list
the specific issues upon which they lobbied (whether on their own behalf or on
a client's behalf), and to give an estimate of the lobbying expenses incurred, on
a semiannual basis.
62
There are, however, numerous exceptions to this disclosure regime. Some
of these exceptions are to the definition of lobbying and will be discussed in
Section I.B. There are also exceptions to the registration and reporting require-
ments for relatively small amounts of lobbying. The most significant exception
is that "lobbyists" do not include individuals whose lobbying activities consti-
tute less than twenty percent of the time spent providing services to the lobby-
ing client (e.g., an attorney who spends eighty-five percent of her time for a par-
ticular client on non-lobbying related legal work) .63 Furthermore, a lobbyist is
not required to register on behalf of a particular client if lobbying income from
the client is $2,500 or less and is not required to register at all if total lobbying
expenses are $10,000 or less.6 4
In contrast to the tax laws regarding lobbying, there is no lack of clarity re-
garding the reasons Congress enacted the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995
the predecessor to the LDA constitutional, although only after adopting a narrow
definition of "lobbying." See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954). Con-
gress recently amended the LDA to increase the frequency, scope, and visibility of
disclosure reports; to increase the penalties for noncompliance; and to require
registered lobbyists to disclose political contributions and fundraising activities in
their LDA reports. Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L.
No. 11o-81, §§ 201-203, 205, 207-211, 121 Stat. 735, 741-44, 746, 747-49 (2007) (codi-
fied at scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.); see also Lobbying Disclosure Act Guidance,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/lobby-disc-briefing.htm (last
visited July 25, 2007) (describing the recent changes).
61. 2 U.S.C.A. § 1602(2), (1o) (West 2007).
62. 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 16o 3(b) (required registration information), 16o 4 (b) (required se-
miannual report information) (West 2007).
63. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 1602(10) (West 2007); Lobbying Disclosure Act Guidance,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefingllobby-disc-briefing.htm (last
visited July 25, 2007) (discussing a similar scenario in the "Relationship Between
20% of Time and Monetary Threshold" subsection).
64. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 16o3(a)(3) (West 2007) (providing these exceptions); Notice Re-
garding January 1, 2005 Increase in Registration Thresholds, http://www.sen-
ate.gov/pagelayout/legislative/one-itemandjteasers/Registration-thresholds pag
e.htm (providing the figures effective for 2005 through 20o8). Both figures apply
for each semiannual reporting period and are adjusted every four years for infla-
tion. 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 1603(a) (3), 1604(a) (West 2007).
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(LDA) and its predecessor, the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946
(FRLA).6" As stated in the Senate Report that accompanied FRLA:
Too often.., the true attitude of public opinion is distorted and
obscured by the pressures of special-interest groups. Beset by swarms
of lobbyists seeking to protect this or that small segment of the econ-
omy or to advance this or that narrow interest, legislators find it diffi-
cult to discover the real majority will and to legislate in the public in-
terest. As Government control of economic life and its use as an
instrument of popular welfare have increased, the activities of these
powerful groups have multiplied ..... Full information regarding the
membership, source of contributions, and expenditures of organized
groups would prove helpful to Congress in evaluating their representa-
tions and weighing their worth. Publicity is a mild step forward in pro-
tecting government under pressure and in promoting the democratiza-
tion of pressure groups."
Consistent with these concerns, Congress enacted the LDA fifty years later
"to strengthen public confidence in government by replacing the existing
patchwork of lobbying disclosure laws with a single, uniform statute which cov-
ers the activities of all professional lobbyists"6 7 and to ensure "responsible rep-
resentative government. "" Congress also sought to remedy perceived flaws in
FRLA and other earlier lobbying disclosure laws.6" A similar motivation lay be-
65. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, 1O9 Stat. 691 (1995); Legisla-
tive Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-6Ol, §§ 301-311, 60 Stat. 812, 839-42
(1946).
66. S. REP. No. 79-1400, at 4-5 (1946); see also United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612
(1954) (upholding the constitutionality of the FRLA based on conclusion that
challenged sections do not violate guarantees of freedom to speak, to publish, or
to petition the government); Note, The Federal Lobbying Act of 1946, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 98, 103 (1947) (describing some of the revelations regarding lobbying by in-
terest groups that had led to earlier, more-limited-in-scope federal disclosure
laws); Comment, Improving the Legislative Process: Federal Regulation of Lobbying,
56 YALE L.J. 304, 311-13 (1947) (providing a more detailed account of the lobbying
activity that led to federal disclosure provisions).
67. H.R. REP. No. 104-339, at 2 (1995).
68. Id. at 12; see also 2 U.S.C. § 16o1(1), (3) (2000) (stating that "responsible represen-
tative Government" requires lobbying disclosure, and that "the effective public
disclosure of the identity and extent of the efforts of paid lobbyists to influence
Federal officials in the conduct of Government actions will increase public confi-
dence in the integrity of Government").
69. H.R. REP. No. 104-339, at 2 (1995); see also 2 U.S.C. § 1601(2) (2000) (stating the
perceived problems with earlier statutes).
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hind the Clinton Administration's efforts to limit interest group influence by
reforming lobbying disclosure laws.
7 °
3. Limiting Interactions Between Government Employees
and Lobbyists
Finally, current law regulates interactions between lobbyists, government
employees, and former government employees. 7' Lobbyists and government
employees (for all three branches) are, of course, subject to the general statutory
prohibitions against bribery.72 Government employees from all branches are al-
so prohibited from soliciting or receiving anything of value that may give rise to
a conflict of interest, subject to certain exceptions, and so are subject to various
restrictions on receiving income and gifts from non-governmental sources, in-
cluding payment or reimbursement of travel expenses.73
70. CLINTON & GORE, supra note 50, at 23-26 (supporting tougher lobbying disclosure
as one way to "take away power from.., special interests that dominate Washing-
ton").
71. See generally CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 6o, at 2-16 (describing these vari-
ous rules). Congress recently enacted a number of significant changes to these
rules, including prohibiting lobbyists from violating the congressional gift and
travel reimbursement rules, making those rules stricter in various ways, and in-
creasing limits both on the lobbying activities of persons related to Members of
Congress and on post-government service private employment by some govern-
ment officials. Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-81, §§ 206, 301-305, 531-533, 541-544, 552 121 Stat. 735, 747, 751-54, 764-66, 766-71,
773 (2007) (adding 2 U.S.C. § 1613 and amending the Rules of the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Standing Rules of the Senate). Some states and localities have
additional rules governing lobbyists. See Johnson, supra note lo, at 18-48 (describ-
ing the federal, state, and local rules governing lobbyists, including state and local
rules specifically barring false statements by lobbyists, limiting campaign contri-
butions or other campaign-related activities by lobbyists, limiting lobbying activi-
ties by family members of government officials, and limiting charity fundraising
by lobbyists on behalf of government officials or employees).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 20(b)(1)-(2) (2000) (defining bribery as making and soliciting or ac-
cepting gifts or other payments for the purpose of influencing official action, en-
couraging fraud on the United States, or inducing violation of official duties).
73. See 2 U.S.C. § 31-2 (2000) (limiting gifts and the payment of travel expenses for
Senators, officers and employees, and in some instances their close family mem-
bers); 5 U.S.C. § 7353 (2000) (generally prohibiting soliciting or accepting any-
thing of value from a person seeking official action or whose interests may be sub-
stantially affected by the actions of the relevant government employee); 31 U.S.C.
§ 1353 (2000) (limiting the acceptance of travel and related expenses by executive
branch employees from non-federal sources); 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.1o1(b)(4), 2635.201-
2635.205 (2007) (limiting gifts to executive branch employees); RULES OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS, R. 25, at 39
(2007), available at http://www.ruies.house.gov/ruleprec/lioth.pdf [hereinafter H.
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But stricter rules apply to relationships between lobbyists registered under
the Lobbying Disclosure Act and some government employees, primarily legis-
lative branch employees who are covered by the congressional rules in this
area.74 These rules prohibit Members, officers, and employees of Congress from
accepting gifts from a registered lobbyist or a private entity that employs regis-
tered lobbyists unless a specific exception (of which there are many) applies.75
Such prohibited gifts include reimbursement of travel expenses by such indi-
viduals and entities in most instances. 76 Even reimbursement for trips that meet
the few exceptions provided is prohibited if a registered lobbyist is involved in
planning or arranging the trip! 7 These new rules are almost certainly a response
to Rep. Tom DeLay's much-publicized golfing trips to Scotland.zs One might
RULES] (limiting outside income and gifts to House Members, officers, and em-
ployees); STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. Doc. No. 11o-9, R. 35-36, at 46-55
(2007), available at http://rues.senate.gov/senaterules/Ruleso914o7.pdf [hereinaf-
ter S. RULES] (limiting, in Rule 35, gifts to Senate Members, officers, and employ-
ees and limiting, in Rule 36, outside earned income of Senate Members, officers,
and employees). Each agency may also set its own, agency-specific rules. See, e.g., 5
C.F.R. §§ 75o1.1O1-75o1.1o6 (2007) (rules for employees of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development).
74. See H. RULES, supra note 73, R. 25, § 5(g)(i), at 43 (defining a registered lobbyist as
a lobbyist registered under the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act or its succes-
sor); S. RULES, supra note 73, R. 35, § 5, at 48 (same); see also Lobbying Disclosure
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, § ii(a), 109 Stat. 691, 701 (1995) (repealing the Fed-
eral Regulation of Lobbying Act).
75. H. RULES, supra note 73, R. 25, § 5(a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(3), at 40-41; S. RULES, supra
note 73, R. 35, § 1(a)(2)(B), at 46; see also 2 U.S.C.A. § 1613 (2007) (prohibiting
LDA registered lobbyists and related entities from making gifts that violate either
the House or Senate rules). Other prohibited gifts for registered lobbyists include
anything provided to an entity controlled by a House Member, officer, or em-
ployee; a charitable contribution made on the basis of a recommendation by a
House Member, officer, or employee; a contribution to the legal defense fund of a
House Member, officer, or employee; and a contribution to a conference or simi-
lar event sponsored by an official congressional organization, for or on behalf of
House Members, officers, or employees. H. RULES, supra note 73, R. 25, § 5(e), at
43.
76. H. RULES, supra note 73, R. 25, § 5(b)(i)(A)-(B), at 42; S. RULES, supra note 73, R.
35, § 2(a)(1), (d)(1), at 51-53; see also 2 U.S.C.A. § 1613 (West 2007) (prohibiting
LDA registered lobbyists and related entities from providing travel if doing so vio-
lates either the House or Senate Rules).
77. H. RULES, supra note 73, R. 25, § 5(c)(3), at 42-43; S. RULES, supra note 73, R, 35,
§ 2(d)(1), at 53.
78. See R. Jeffrey Smith, DeLay Airfare Was Charged to Lobbyist's Credit Card, WASH.
POST, Apr. 24, 2005, at Aoi (noting that expenses for food, phone calls, and other
items were charged to the credit cards of Jack Abramoff and Edwin A. Buckham,
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expect such congressional rules to be lax given that the very members of Con-
gress who most benefit from the largesse of lobbyists are the ones writing these
rules (a classic fox guarding the henhouse situation), yet, in large part because
of public pressure in the wake of various scandals, these rules place real limita-
tions on the ability of lobbyists to influence government officials, particularly
members and employees of Congress. 7 9
Finally, certain former legislative and executive branch members, officers,
and employees are prohibited by statute from engaging in certain types of lob-
bying activities-typically, direct contact with their respective congressional
chamber or government agency-within a certain period after ending their
government employmento Other, lengthier restrictions apply for matters in
which former government employees had a personal involvement." Individuals
who are registered lobbyists and persons related to them are also prohibited
from serving in certain government roles. s2
The reasons for the rules governing financial transactions with government
officials and employees, including the House and Senate rules governing gifts,
are not difficult to fathom. Such transactions raise the risk of both improper in-
terference with official duties and responsibilities-corruption-and the ap-
pearance of such interference-the appearance of corruption."s It is, therefore,
both Registered lobbyists, but that DeLay claimed to believe the expenses to have
been covered by a nonprofit, the Center for Public Policy Research).
79. See, e.g., Press Release, Joan Claybrook, President, Pub. Citizen, The noth Con-
gress Delivers on Lobbying and Ethics Reforms (Sept. 14, 2007), http://www.citi-
zen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=2511 (calling the passage of the most recent
legislation regulating lobbyists legislation "the most far-reaching ethics reforms
on lobbyists and lawmakers in decades"); Press Release, Meredith McGehee, Pol-
icy Dir., Campaign Legal Ctr., Lobbying & Ethics Reforms (Sept. 14, 2007),
http://www.campaignlegalcenter.orglpress-2894.html (applauding same as "a sub-
stantively strong measure that surpasses expectations").
8o. 18 U.S.C. § 207 (2000) (prohibiting legislative branch members and certain execu-
tive branch employees from this type of lobbying for one or two years after leav-
ing government service). By Executive Order, a five-year ban applied to certain
senior appointees lobbying any employee in their former agency during the Clin-
ton Administration, but that requirement ended in 2001. See Exec. Order. No.
12,834, 58 Fed. Reg. 5911 (January 20, 1993); Exec. Order No. 13,184, 3 C.F.R. 341
(2000) (revoking Exec. Order No. 12,834 effective Jan. 20, 2001).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2000).
82. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C.A. § 352 (West 2007) (prohibiting service on the Citizens' Com-
mission on Public Service and Compensation for registered lobbyists); id. § 1381
(prohibiting service in the Office of Compliance for Congress for registered lob-
byists who lobby Congress).
83. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 60, at i (noting that the various restric-
tions on interactions between lobbyists and Congress's Members, officers, and
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perhaps inevitable that highly publicized influence-peddling accusations involv-
ing government officials often result in revisiting and extending these rules,
with the Jack Abramoff scandal being only the latest example.8 4
As a result, lobbyists have become subject to special scrutiny and to tighter
restrictions. A 1994 Senate committee report in support of special gift rules for
lobbyists stated the reasons for this special treatment:
[It seems appropriate to single out registered lobbyists ... for special
treatment, because this category includes people who are, by definition,
in the business of seeking to influence the outcome of public policy de-
cisions. Because registered lobbyists ... are paid to influence the ac-
tions of public officials, including legislative branch officials, their gifts
are uniquely susceptible to the appearance that they are intended to
purchase access and influence8 5
Similar concerns motivated the adoption by the House of Representatives of its
special rules for gifts from lobbyists and the 2007 revisions to both the LDA and
various lobbyist-related House and Senate Rules. 6 Furthermore, the limitations
on post-government service lobbying by former government officials and em-
ployees also have their origins in concerns about improper influence. 87
4. Conclusion
Even with their disparate origins, all of the federal laws governing lobbying
and lobbyists appear now to share a common purpose: to limit both the actual
employees had been adopted to limit potential or perceived undue or improper
influences on government officials).
84. See Krishnakumar, supra note lo, at 514-15 & n.1 (noting that efforts to reform
rules relating to lobbying tend to follow highly publicized lobbying scandals, in-
cluding the most recent ones involving Jack Abramoff and Tom DeLay).
85. S. REP. No. 103-255, at 3-4 (1994).
86. H.R. REP. No. 104-337, at 8 (1995); see also 153 CONG. REC. S220 (daily ed. Jan. 8,
2007) (statement of Sen. Reid) ("When we make leaders accountable to the peo-
ple, not the special interests or lobbyists, there is no limit to what we can accom-
plish."). Senator Reid gave this statement as part of his introduction of the Honest
Leadership Act, which became the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act
of 2007, Pub. L. No. 11o-81, 121 Stat. 735 (2007).
87. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON FEDERAL ETHICS LAW REFORM, To SERVE WITH
HONOR: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ETHICS LAW RE-
FORM 55-56 (1989) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT] (noting that
the purpose of the "one-year cooling-off period" for senior executive branch em-
ployees was to limit the use in lobbying of their presumed special influence and
access and recommending that for the same reason that period should be ex-
tended to legislative and judicial branch senior employees).
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and perceived influence of interest groups on government actions."8 This pur-
pose is in contrast to ensuring a level playing field for all those seeking to influ-
ence government action by any branch, a purpose that has been cited in the past
with respect to at least the tax rules but appears to have supplanted by interest
group influence concerns, particularly in recent years.
The pursuit of this interest group limiting purpose is tempered by the need
for reliable information, by practical realities, and perhaps also by government
officials' desire to enjoy lobbyist-funded favors, the most important being re-
election support. Over time, however, and particularly in the past decade or so,
concerns about the negative effects of lobbying appear to have dominated. This
conclusion is supported by the denial of deductibility for business-related lob-
bying expenditures in 1993, the passage of the Lobbying Disclosure of 1995, and
the recent tightening of congressional rules governing lobbying in the wake of
the Abramoff scandal. Given this common purpose, one might naturally expect
that how "lobbying" is defined for these various rules would be very similar, if
not exactly the same. This, however, is not the case.
B. "Lobbying" Defined
The definitions of "lobbying" vary significantly."s The tax laws provide
three definitions of lobbying, while the LDA provides another definition. Even
more confusingly, the LDA permits some organizations to use tax law defini-
tions instead of the LDA definition. Finally, the application of the lobbyist re-
strictions turns on whether an individual is, or an organization employs, a lob-
byist registered under the LDA, which in turn can depend on either the LDA
88. In a congressionally ordered report, the U.S. General Accounting Office (now the
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)) concluded that the various tax
rules and the LDA, and specifically the definitions of lobbying under those rules,
were adopted "to achieve different purposes." U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
FEDERAL LOBBYING: DIFFERENCES IN LOBBYING DEFINITIONS AND THEIR IMPACT
22 (1999) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. A careful reading of the report shows, how-
ever, that what the GAO identified was that the different rules used different
methods-taxing versus disclosure-but did not explore whether the different
methods served the same ultimate purpose. Id. at 4-5.
89. For the sake of simplicity, this Article uses the term "lobbying" to encompass the
activity regulated by the various laws at issue, although the various rules do not
always use the specific term "lobbying" or use it to only refer to a subset of the re-
gulated activity. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 16o2(7)-(8), (1o) (West 2005) (defining the terms
"lobbying activities," "lobbying contact," and "lobbyist"); I.R.C. § 162(e) (2000)
(using the term "lobbying" only in the subsection heading); id. § 501(c)(3) (using
the terms "propaganda" and "influence legislation," but not "lobbying"); id.
§ 5ol(h)(2)(A) (defining the term "lobbying expenditures"); id. § 4911 (same); id.
§ 4945(d)(1) (using the same terms as I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)).
26:485 2008
WHAT IS THIS "LOBBYING" THAT WE ARE SO WORRIED ABOUT?
definition alone or a hybrid of the LDA definition and one of the tax defini-
tions.
This Section will explore the range of definitions for lobbying, first by ex-
amining two broad approaches to the definition of lobbying. One approach fo-
cuses entirely on what government action an individual or entity seeks to influ-
ence. Two tax definitions define lobbying this way. The other way of thinking
about lobbying is to focus entirely on what government actor an individual or
entity seeks to influence. The LDA definition falls under this approach. Then
there are definitions that use a combination of government action and govern-
ment actor to define lobbying. The definitions that fall into this middle ground
are the third tax definition, which applies to businesses, and a hybrid of the
LDA and tax definitions that certain entities can choose to use under the LDA
for some purposes. 9
i. Lobbying Defined by Government Action
Tax law defines lobbying solely by the type of government action charity
and private foundations seek to influence. As section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code currently states, the key is whether a substantial part of a pur-
ported charity's activities "is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting,
to influence legislation."91 Legislation is defined to include any items voted on
by Congress, by any state legislature, by any local council or similar body, or by
the public in a referendum or like procedure. 9 This definition of lobbying en-
compasses efforts targeting members of the legislative branch or the public, the
latter not just with respect to referenda on which the public votes directly but
also with respect to grassroots lobbying.93 But lobbying does not include at-
90. None of these laws take the approach found in the Foreign Agents Registration
Act, which reaches all attempts to influence federal government actions regardless
of the specific federal government actor or action involved. See 22 U.S.C.A.
§ 611(o) (West 2007) (defining "political activities" broadly to cover any activity
intended to influence any federal agency or official or the public with respect to
any federal government policy). Assuming that concerns about the possible influ-
ence of those acting on behalf of foreign interests justify the breadth of this defini-
tion, for the reasons described in Sections II.C and Ill.C, such a broad definition
is not justified with respect to the laws governing lobbying by those representing
domestic interests.
91. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) (emphasis added).
92. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii) (199o) (defining "legislation"); Kindell &
Reilly, supra note 31, at 270-71 (distinguishing than an action is a "similar matter"
when it is an item voted upon by the legislative body).
93. See Treas. Reg. § 15O1(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii)(a) (as amended in 199o) (explicitly includ-
ing within "attempting to influence legislation" the urging of members of the
public to contact legislative branch members for the purpose of influencing legis-
lation); Rev. Rul. 67-293, 1967-2 C.B. 185 (same).
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tempts to influence actions by administrative agencies other than actions relat-
ing to influencing legislation.9 4 It also does not include attempts to influence the
judicial branch, unless again that influence is designed to cause judicial branch
officials or employees to influence legislation.95
Most charities also have the option of choosing an alternate lobbying re-
striction that replaces the vague "no substantial part" limit with a bright-line
dollar limit calculated as a percentage of total expenditures. 96 A definition of
lobbying that is similar to the one used under the default, no substantial part
limit, applies for purposes of this alternate regime. The primary difference be-
tween the two definitions is that this second, elective definition is more detailed,
including with respect to its exceptions, and some of the exceptions may not be
available under the default definition.9 7 "Lobbying expenditures" for such
charities "means expenditures for the purpose of influencing legislation." ' Leg-
94. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (flush language) (as amended in 199o) (2007) (de-
fining "legislation" as action by the Congress, any state legislature, a local council,
or similar governing body, or by the public in a referendum or similar proce-
dure); id. § 56.4 911-2(d)(1) (defining "legislation" as including action by any legis-
lative body or the public in a referendum or "similar procedure"); id. § 56.4911-
2(d)(3) (defining a "legislative body" as not including any administrative or judi-
cial bodies); Kindell & Reilly, supra note 31, at 271.
95. See Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(d)(3)-(4); Kindell & Reilly, supra note 31, at 271.
96. See I.R.C. § 501(h)(1)-(8) (2000) (permitting this election for most charities other
than churches and church-related entities), id. § 4911(d) (defining the term "influ-
encing legislation").
97. See Rev. Rul. 66-258, 1966-2 C.B. 213 (holding similarly to Rev. Rul. 64-195, 1964-2
C.B. 138), modified and superseded on other grounds by Rev. Rul. 76-456, 1976-2
C.B. 151; Kindell & Reilly, supra note 31, at 270-77 & n.20, 295-311 (describing the
two definitions and the exceptions applicable to each one, and also noting that the
IRS has never published a precedential document accepting certain exceptions to
the default definition). Compare I.R.C. § 4911(d)(2)(A)-(E) (2000) (listing five ex-
ceptions available under the alternate regime), and Treas. Reg. § 56.4 9 u-2(b)
(2007) (providing a detailed definition for lobbying and a detailed description of
the statutory exceptions), with I.R.C. § 5o1(c)(3) (2000) (not including any ex-
plicit exceptions), and Treas. Reg. § 1.5o1(c)(3)-1 (as amended in 199o) (2007)
(providing a less detailed definition of influencing legislation and not including
any explicit exceptions, except that subparagraph 1.501(c)(3)(iv) suggests that an
exception exists for making the results of nonpartisan analysis, study, or research
available to the public), and Rev. Rul. 70-449, 1970-2 C.B. iii (providing an excep-
tion for testimony before a legislative committee provided in response to an offi-
cial request), and Rev. Rul. 64-195, 1964-2 C.B. 138 (concluding that nonpartisan
study and research on a public policy issue would not affect the exempt status of
an IRC § 5o1(c)(3) organization that is not involved in presenting suggested bills
or urging support for or opposition to a constitutional amendment on the same
issue).
98. I.R.C. § 4911(c) (2000).
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islation is in turn defined as the introduction, amendment, enactment, defeat or
repeal of Acts, bills, resolutions, or similar items by the Congress, any state leg-
islature, any local council, or similar governing body, or by the public in a refer-
endum or similar procedure.9 9 The definition includes attempts to influence
members and employees of the legislative branch, "any other government offi-
cial or employee who may participate in the formulation of legislation," and the
public. ' ° Essentially the same definition applies for purposes of the private
foundation lobbying prohibition.' For all types of charities, therefore, the de-
terminative issue is whether the target of the attempted influence is legislation.
2. Lobbying Defined by Government Actor
The Lobbying Disclosure Act focuses almost entirely on the government ac-
tor sought to be influenced, in contrast to the tax definition for charities de-
scribed above.0 2 This difference is also in contrast to the LDA's predecessor, the
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, which, like the current tax definitions of
lobbying for charities, focused solely on whether legislation was at issue.' 3 The
LDA creates two categories of government actors, "covered executive branch
officials" and "covered legislative branch officials."'0 4 Under the LDA, commu-
nications with individuals who fall within either of these two categories consti-
tute lobbying if those communications are with regard to legislation, executive
branch action, a federal program or policy, or the nomination or confirmation
of a person for a position subject to confirmation by the Senate.0 5 The LDA de-
finition of lobbying therefore does not include grassroots lobbying. The only
government actions that appear to be exempt from LDA coverage are presiden-
tial clemency orders and pardons."06
Covered legislative branch officials include any member, officer, or em-
ployee of the House or Senate. 07 Covered executive branch officials include the
99. Id. § 4911(e)(2)-(3).
oo. Id. § 4911(d)(1). See generally Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(b)(1) (1990).
1O. I.R.C. § 4945(d)(1), (e) (2000).
102. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 16o2(8)(A) (West 2007) (defining "lobbying contact" by reference
to the government actor contacted).
103. The Regulation of Lobbying Act was included as Title III to the Legislative Reor-
ganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. 79-6ol, 6o Stat. 812 (defining lobbyist by reference
to whether they seek to influence legislation) (repealed 1995).
104. 2 U.S.C.A. § 1602(3), (4), (8)(A) (West 2007).
105. Id. § 1602(8)(A).
1o6. See Kathryn L. Plemmons, "Lobbying Activities" and Presidential Pardons: Will
Legislators' Efforts To Amend the LDA Lead to Increasingly Hard-Lined Jurispru-
dence, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 131, 131 (2003).
107. 2 U.S.C.A. § 1602(4) (West 2007); 5 U.S.C.A. § 109(13) app. (West 2007).
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President, the Vice President, any officer or employee in the Executive Office of
the President, any officer or employee in Executive Schedule levels I through V
(usually assistant secretary or deputy director level, or above), any military of-
ficer with a rank if 0-7 or above (i.e., Brigadier General/Rear Admiral, or
above), and other federal employees serving in confidential, policy-
determining, policy-making, or policy-advocating positions. °o The last catego-
ry, known as "Schedule C" employees, are employees who may be appointed
and removed at the discretion of the appointing official (usually a political ap-
pointee of the President), subject to approval of the White House Office of
Presidential Personnel and the Office of Personnel Management.' 9 To aid indi-
viduals and groups in their compliance with the LDA, contacted executive (and
legislative) branch officials and employees must indicate whether they are cov-
ered by the LDA, if asked.' 0
With the exception of the military officers, these categories essentially cor-
respond to the positions that may be filled without being subject to the compet-
itive appointment process that usually applies to federal government positions,
and from which employees may be removed without the termination protec-
tions that also normally apply to such positions."' Military officers whom a ser-
vice seeks to promote above the 0-6 rank (i.e., to a rank covered by the LDA
definition) must be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate."2
While this line drawing choice may reflect a belief that positions falling outside
of normal civil service or military hiring and promotion rules are most vulnera-
ble to undue influence, the only explicit explanation was the cryptic statement
by the original sponsor of the LDA that the law made this distinction because it
is with these executive branch officials that "lobbying really has an impact.""' 3
lO8. 2 U.S.C.A. § 1602(3) (West 2007); see also 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 5312-5316 (2007) (listing
the positions to which levels I through V of the Executive Schedule apply); 37
U.S.C. § 201 (2000) (listing the military ranks); STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV'T
REFORM, 108TH CONG., POLICY AND SUPPORTING POSITIONS (Comm. Print 2004)
[hereinafter POLICY POSITIONS] (listing the legislative and executive branch posi-
tions that may be subject to noncompetitive appointment as of Sept. 30, 2004).
109. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7511(b)(2)(B) (West 2007); 5 C.F.R. § 300.301 (2006).
110. 2 U.S.C.A. § 16o9(c) (West 2007).
Inl. See POLICY POSITIONS, supra note io8, at iii (noting that these positions are in-
cluded in the ones that may be subject to noncompetitive appointment).
112. See Military Commissioned Officer Promotions, http://usmilitary.about.com/od/
promotions/1/blofficerprom.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2007).
113. 141 CONG. REC. S10 5 12, S1o 551 (daily ed. July 24, 1995) (statement of Sen. Levin
upon his introduction of the LDA).
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3. Lobbying Defined by Government Action and Actor
The definition of lobbying for purposes of both denying (prior to 1962) and
permitting (from 1962 through 1993) a business expense deduction for lobbying
expenditures was very close to the two definitions used for charities, in that it
depended on whether the government action at issue was legislation or not."4
When, at the urging of the Treasury Department, Congress revisited this issue
in 1993, it defined lobbying in a manner similar to that for electing charities and
private foundations, still focusing on the government action at issue." 5 But
Congress also expanded the reach of the denial to include direct communica-
tion "with a covered executive branch official in an attempt to influence the of-
ficial actions or positions of such official.""..6
Thus, Congress effectively created a hybrid definition of lobbying for a
third tax definition, which relied in part on the government action at issue (leg-
islation) but also in part on the government actor at issue (certain very senior
executive branch officials). The definition of a "covered executive branch offi-
cial" is much narrower in this context than in the LDA context, with the tax de-
finition including only the President, the Vice President, Cabinet officers or
their equivalents and their immediate deputies, the two most senior-level offi-
cers of each agency within the Executive Office of the President, and other offi-
cials or employees of the White House Office of the Executive Office of the
President."7 The legislative history is silent as to why Congress expanded the de-
finition in this manner."'
The LDA also gives certain non-lobbying-firm entities the option of choos-
ing to use the hybrid action/actor definition of lobbying that applies for tax
purposes for some purposes."9 One purpose is when estimating the amount
114. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 45, art. 562 (1921) (last sentence), reprinted in 134 INTERNAL
REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1909-1950: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES,
LAWS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 144 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979);
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15(c) (196o); see also Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834,
§ 3, 76 Stat. 960, 973 (I.R.C. § 162(e) as initially enacted).
115. Compare sources cited supra notes 98-1Ol, with I.R.C. § 162(e)(4) (2000).
116. I.R.C. § 162(e)(1)(D) (2000).
117. Id. § 162(e)(6).
118. See H.R. REP. No. 103-213, at 174, 6O-02, 604-07 (1993) (noting, without explana-
tion, that the Senate amendment added contacts with certain high-ranking federal
executive branch officials, defined in manner similar to the current LDA defini-
tion, but the conference agreement limited "covered executive branch officials" to
the current, significantly smaller group).
119. 2 U.S.C.A. § 161o(a)-(b) (West 2007). For this option to be available, the non-
lobbying-firm entity must be either a business subject to § 162(e) or a charity that
uses the alternate, elective regime for defining lobbying. An individual would have
this option if he or she operated a sole proprietorship, such as solo law practice,
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spent on lobbying expenditures for LDA reporting purposes, for which the tax
definition replaces the LDA definition.2 ' This change has the effect of both ex-
panding and shrinking the range of expenditures reported. It expands the defi-
nition because the tax definitions include activities not covered by the LDA,
most significantly, grassroots lobbying and lobbying of state and, for electing
charities but not businesses, local governments. 2' It shrinks the definition be-
cause the tax definitions exclude certain activities covered by the LDA. Most
significantly, the tax definition for businesses reaches only non-legislation-
related communication with a very small group of executive branch officials,
and the tax definition for electing charities does not reach executive branch
communications unrelated to legislation at all. 2 '
The other purpose is when determining whether an individual has engaged
in sufficient lobbying contacts and activities to be required to register as a lob-
byist.'23 For this purpose, the LDA only partially uses the definition, sweeping
into lobbying any government-action-related contacts with covered legislative
branch officials (as defined by the LDA) but only including government-action
related contacts with executive branch officials to the extent that such contacts
are considered lobbying under the applicable tax definition.'2 4 This change both
expands and shrinks the range of activities that can result in an individual hav-
ing to register as a lobbyist. For businesses, it expands the definition by includ-
ing legislation-related contacts with any executive branch officials, regardless of
whetherthey are "covered executive branch officials" under the LDA. At the
same time, this hybrid scheme narrows the definition by not reaching non-
legislation-related contacts with senior executive branch officials other than a
handful of very senior such officials.'25 For electing charities the result is almost
the same, except that the modified definition does not reach non-legislation-
related contacts with any executive branch officials. '26
because then the individual would be a "business" for tax law purposes. See IN-
TERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GUIDE FOR SMALL BUSINESS 2 (2006) (defining
"sole proprietor").
120. 2 U.S.C.A. § 16io(a)(i), (b)(i) (West 2007).
121. Compare I.R.C. §§ 162(e)(4), 162(e)(6), 4911(d)(1) (2000), with 2 U.S.C.A.
§ 1601(3), (4), (8) (West 2007).
122. See supra note 121.
123. 2 U.S.C.A. § 161o(a)(2), (b)(2) (West 2007).
124. Id.
125. I.R.C. § 162(e)(6) (2000).
126. Compare I.R.C. § 4911(d)(1) (2000), with 2 U.S.C.A. § 1601(3), (8) (West 2007).
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4. Exceptions
While the various definitions used in these three sets of lobbying rules con-
tain numerous exceptions, these exceptions can be grouped into three catego-
ries. One class of exceptions is designed to ensure that the flow of accurate and
helpful information to government officials and to the public is not unduly
hindered.2 7 This category includes exceptions for testimony or other informa-
tion provided in response to official requests or as part of official proceedings,2'
making the results of nonpartisan analysis available,2 9 and other informational
communications to the public.'30 For the most part, these exceptions appear de-
signed to exclude communications that are relatively public and therefore sub-
ject to review and, if inaccurate or improper, challenge by competing interest
groups, the media, and the public.'31 It should be noted, however, that Congress
has favored charities over other types of interest groups with respect to these
exceptions as they exist in the tax rules, as all of these exceptions are available to
127. See H.R. REP. No. 104-339, at 14-17 (1995) (elaborating on the reasons for the vari-
ous exceptions).
128. I.R.C. § 4911(d)(2)(B) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(c)(3) (199o); Rev. Rul. 70-
449, 1970-2 C.B. ill; see also 2 U.S.C.A. § 16o2(8)(B)(vi)-(x), (xii)-(xvii), (xix)
(West 2007) (excepting various types of communications with government offi-
cials). Some of the LDA exceptions also relate to very specific types of government
actions or proceedings that are distinct from efforts to influence government ac-
tions that have general applicability. These exceptions include one for contacts re-
lating to law enforcement activities, 2 U.S.C.A. § 1602(8)(B)(xii)(I) (West 2007),
matters required by law to be confidential id. § 16o2(8)(B)(xii)(II), agency adjudi-
cations pursuant to written agency procedures, id. § 16o2(8)(B)(xiii), personnel
matters for a specific individual, id. § 1602(8)(B)(xvi), whistleblowing activity
protected by law, id. § 1602(8)(B)(xvii), and communications between certain
recognized self-regulatory organizations and specific government agencies, id.
§ 1602(8)(B)(xix).
129. I.R.C. §§ 49 11(d)(2)(A), 4945(e) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(c)(1) (199o) (ex-
cluding nonpartisan analysis, defined as "independent and objective exposition of
a particular subject matter," from the definition of influencing legislation); Treas.
Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iv) (as amended 199o); Rev. Rul. 64-195, 1964-2 C.B. 138;
Rev. Rul. 70-79, 1970-1 C.B. 127.
130. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 1602(8)(B)(ii) (West 2007) (media communications made for
newsgathering purposes); id. § 16o2(8)(B)(iii) (communications to the general
public). The LDA also excludes communications by public officials, whether fed-
eral or not, acting in performance of their official duties. Id. § 16o2(8)(B)(i).
131. See S. REP. No. 103-37, at 29 (1993) (noting, for an earlier version of the LDA, that
the exceptions include communications that are "already subject to formal proce-
dural safeguards and record-keeping requirements").
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charities but none are available for the business expenses deduction rule.'32 For
the LDA, various types of communications with government officials are ex-
empted for all types of entities and individuals; since the LDA does not reach
communications with the public, no LDA exceptions related to such exceptions
are needed.133
The second category encompasses communications that facilitate the or-
ganization's internal communications or protect its very existence. These excep-
tions include membership communications3 4 and "self-defense" lobbying,
where an organization's tax status or ability to function is at issue.'35 These ex-
ceptions only exist in the tax context, and only with respect to charities (includ-
ing private foundations), not businesses." 6
The third and final category includes exceptions that appear to have been
designed to reduce the administrative burdens of the relevant rules. This cate-
gory excludes communications with non-legislative government officials when
influencing legislation is not the principal purpose of the communication, 37 ex-
cluding communications with local councils,' 38 excluding communications with
132. Compare I.R.C. § 49 11(d)(2)(A) (2000) (providing exceptions for private founda-
tions and charities that elect the optional sliding percentage regime for measuring
lobbying, including for nonpartisan analysis and technical advice), with id.
§ 162(e) (not providing any comparable exceptions).
133. See sources cited supra notes 128 & 130.
134. I.R.C. § 4911(d)(2)(D), (d)(3) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-5 (1990).
135. I.R.C. §§ 4 911(d)(2)(C), 4945(e) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(c)(4) (1990).
136. Compare I.R.C. § 4 9 11(d)(2)(A) (2000) (providing exceptions for private founda-
tions and charities that elect the optional sliding percentage regime for measuring
lobbying, including for certain membership communications and communica-
tions relating to decisions that "might affect the existence of the organization, its
powers and duties, tax-exempt status, or the deduction of contributions to the or-
ganization"), with id. § 162(e) (not providing any comparable exceptions). The
self-defense exception is not necessary under the existing LDA disclosure regime
because that regime does not prevent or limit lobbying but only requires its dis-
closure. This is in contrast to the tax rules for charities, which limit lobbying by
charities (or prohibit it, in the case of private foundations). A membership com-
munications exception is also not necessary for the LDA definition, since the LDA
does not reach any communications with the public.
137. I.R.C. § 4911(d)(2)(E)) (2000); see also 2 U.S.C.A. § 16o1(8)(B)(v) (West 2007)
(excepting communications that do not include an attempt to influence govern-
ment action, such as a request for a meeting or for the status of an action).
138. I.R.C. § 162(e)(2) (2000); see Julian Avakian-Martin, New Business Provisions Out-
lined by Congressional Staff Members, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 22, 1993, LEXIS, 93
TNT 196-4 (reporting that Kathleen Nilles, House Ways and Means Committee
tax counsel, explained that the reason for the local and Indian tribe lobbying ex-
ceptions was that the perceived difficulty of distinguishing between legislative and
administrative functions at the local level).
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the public that do not include a "call to action," 13 9 and various de minimis ex-
ceptions. 4
Besides usually falling into one of these three categories, there are two pat-
terns to these exceptions. First, Congress has tended to favor charities in the tax
rules by granting them a number of exceptions that it denies to businesses. It is
unclear, however, why Congress did so. One possibility is that the substantive
rule for charities is more draconian, limiting lobbying to an insubstantial activ-
ity for most charities and absolutely prohibiting it for private foundations, as
compared to the rule for businesses, which disallows a deduction for their lob-
bying expenditures but still permits them to engage in as much lobbying as they
desire.' 4' Another possibility is that Congress felt that charities were more likely
to exercise their influence in a positive way, particularly with respect to provid-
ing information to government actors and to the public. Constitutional con-
cerns may also have driven the single LDA exception that favors a particular
class of entities: the exception for communications by churches, church-related
entities, and religious orders. 42
139. Treas. Reg. § 5 6. 4 9 11-2(b)(2)(ii) (199o). This requirement does not apply to cer-
tain mass media communications relating to highly publicized legislation. Id.
§ 56.4911-2(b)(5). This and many of the other bright-line rules embodied in the
I.R.C. § 4911 (2000) regulations resulted from a firestorm of negative comments
from both members of Congress and the public in response to an initial set of
regulations that defining lobbying in a relatively broad and vague manner. See
Kindell & Reilly, supra note 31, at 283-84 (summarizing this history). It has been
argued that this exception and others embodied in I.R.C. § 4911 were designed not
just for administrative convenience but intentionally to encourage and support
additional lobbying by charities. See Thomas A. Troyer et al., Analysis of the Dif-
fering Definitions of "Lobbying" in Federal Law, 16 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 795,
797-98 (1997). As discussed below, while that may have been true in a marginal
sense, Congress did not purport to be abandoning the general limitation of lobby-
ing by charities to an insubstantial part of their activities.
140. E.g., I.R.C. § 162(e)(5)(B)(i) (2000) (excluding in-house lobbying expenses that do
not exceed $2000 annually). The elective charity and private foundation defini-
tions also exclude examinations of broad social problems, Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-
2(c)(2) (199o), and the private foundation definitions exclude certain communi-
cations related to projects funded jointly by government agencies and private
foundations, Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-2(a)(2) (as amended in 199o). The LDA also
excludes communications already disclosed under the Foreign Agents Registra-
tion Act of 1938, 2 U.S.C. § 16o2(8)(B)(iv) (2000).
141. This almost certainly is the reason behind the exception for so-called "self-
defense" lobbying. See I.R.C. § 4 911(d)(2)(C) (2000) (excluding communications
relating to decisions that "might affect the existence of the organization, its pow-
ers and duties, tax-exempt status, or the deduction of contributions to the organi-
zation"); Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(c)(4) (199o) (elaborating on this exception and
characterizing it as pertaining to "self-defense").
142. 2 U.S.C. § 16o2(8)(B)(xviii) (2000).
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Second, the exceptions vary because of differences in the overall definition
of lobbying under each set of rules. For example, the LDA does not require ex-
ceptions for certain types of communications with the public because the LDA
does not cover any communications with the public. In a like way, the tax rules
do not require exceptions for communications that are part of proceedings only
affecting particular entities or individuals, such as personnel proceedings or
agency adjudications, because the tax rules do not, for the most part, reach
communications with executive branch officials that are unrelated to legisla-
tion.' 43
C. Conclusion
As discussed in Section I.A, the common purpose underlying the various
federal laws regulating lobbying is limiting the actual and perceived undue in-
fluence of interest groups. Taking this purpose as a given does not, however, an-
swer the question of whether the varying definitions of lobbying under these
rules should be altered or reconciled so as to better further this common pur-
pose.' 44 Answering this definitional question requires a better understanding of
how interest groups actually influence government actions. Part II reviews the
extensive scholarship addressing the role of interest groups in United States pol-
itics and how it helps to define lobbying.145
143. See S. REP. No. 103-37, at 25 (1993) (noting, for an earlier version of the LDA, that
the exceptions include "many communications with executive branch officials
[that] should not be covered by this bill[) because they are routine in nature, [or]
inherently confidential").
144. The question of whether the existing rules, even when paired with the best possi-
ble definition of lobbying, are actually effective in serving this purpose is beyond
the scope of this Article, although this question is the subject of much debate. See,
e.g., Johnson, supra note lo, at 56 (concluding that disclosure rules have only a li-
mited ability to address bad practices associated with lobbying and so more legal
prohibitions should be adopted); Krishnakumar, supra note lo, at 518-23 (arguing
that the existing disclosure rules are ineffective and so primarily symbolic); Lune-
burg & Susman, supra note lo, at 33-34 (identifying various shortcomings with the
existing disclosure rules).
145. For the most recent reviews of interest group research, see generally BERRY &
WILCOX, supra note 2; and INTEREST GROUP POLITICS, supra note 5. As detailed in
the next Section, an apparent paucity of studies about group influence generally
and lobbying by interest groups, specifically before the late 199os, has at least been
partially cured in the past decade. See BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 2, at
xvi, xviii. As a historical note, the first significant academic studies of lobbying in
the United States were in the 192os. See, e.g., HERRING, Supra note 3, at viii (noting
that a 1929 book was one of the first to address the role of interest groups); Freder-
ick K. Beutel, The Pressure of Organized Interests as a Factor in Shaping Legislation,
3 S. CAL. L. REV. 10, 20 & n.40 (1929) (noting the limited existing scholarship
about lobbying); Logan & Patten, supra note 3, at 1 (noting the need, in 1929, to
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II. INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE
Both the apparent rapid growth of federal lobbying activity-lobbying ex-
penditures grew from $1.47 billion in 1999 to $2.61 billion in 2006-and recent
scandals involving government employees has brought the issue of interest
group influence back into focus.' 46 This Part reviews the most current research
on how interest groups influence government actions. '47 The first Section de-
scribes what this research reveals about how interest groups influence govern-
ment actions, and, more specifically, how that influence varies depending on
the type of government actor involved. The second Section examines, whether
certain types of interest groups wield greater influence than others and-why, fo-
cusing in particular on the commonly assumed advantage of business groups
over non-business groups. The third and final Section then asks whether all
such influence is in fact undesirable-and should be subject to some or all of
the rules reviewed above-or whether some types of influence tend to be bene-
ficial and thus should not be reached by those rules.
A. How Interest Groups Influence Government Actions
Almost all studies of interest group influence focus on the government ac-
tors who are the subject of the attempted influence instead of the government
actions that are ultimately sought.'14 While the reasons for this focus are not of-
ten made explicit, they are not difficult to discern. It is ultimately the govern-
ment actors that make the decisions, and so it is their interests-and the extent
to which interest groups can help further those interests-that determines the
study lobbying). Earlier accounts were primarily anecdotal, not systematic, al-
though often quite entertaining. See, e.g., HUDSON C. TANNER, "THE LOBBY" AND
PUBLIC MEN (1888) (describing lobbying of the New York legislature during the
18oos).
146. See THE POLICY COUNCIL, CHANGING OF THE GUARD: 2007 STATE OF THE INDUS-
TRY FOR LOBBYING AND ADVOCACY 8 (2007) (listing annual lobbying expenditures
reported under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995); Lobbying Database,
http://www.opensecrets.orgllobbyists/index.asp (last visited Aug. 9, 2007) (report-
ing similar figures).
147. For information about the development of interest group scholarship, see gener-
ally, in chronological order, ARTHUR BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT
(1908); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS
AND PUBLIC OPINION (1951); JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
(1973); and BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 2.
148. See the numerous studies cited in this Section. It is generally accepted that interest
groups use a variety of tactics and target a variety of government officials, depend-
ing on the particular issue involved. E.g., BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 2, at
147-48.
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extent of interest group influence. 49 Of course, the motivations of individual
government actors are not the only influence on their decisions. Institutional
structures also play a role in shaping decision making by the legislature, execu-
tive branch agencies, and the courts. 5 But such motivations are a key path to
influence government actions.'5'
This focus on government actors may also be explained by the fact that
government actors are usually not institutionally constrained from influencing
their subset of government actions. For example, members of Congress, if they
choose, can have significant influence on executive branch agency actions.
There is still an unresolved scholarly debate over whether such influence occurs
only rarely-in response to clear agency overreaching-or is a constant and
significant part of each agency's environment.5 But through many mecha-
149. See, e.g., WILLIAM NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERN-
MENT 4-5 (1971) (concluding that to develop a viable theory of bureau behavior,
including of government bureaus, requires incorporating the personal preferences
of bureaucrats); Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political Faith, 22
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 959, 974 (1997) (reviewing NIEL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT
ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POL-
ICY (1994)) (noting that institutions, including different parts of government, can
be differentiated by focusing on the motivations of institutional actors); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski & Cynthia A. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government De-
sign, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 562-63 (2002) (developing two models to explain
government decisions, one focusing on the self-interest of the individual govern-
ment actors, the other on their flawed judgments).
150. See, e.g., KOMESAR, supra note 149, at 6o (arguing that a focus on such motivations
is misplaced, in part because it overlooks the dynamics of institutional decision-
making that is only "tenuously related to the motives of the individual partici-
pants").
151. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 149, at 974 (noting that Professor Komesar's approach
risks ignoring the important role of individual motivations). Such influence may
be exercised to either cause government to act or to prevent government from
acting (e.g., by preventing certain legislative proposals or proposed regulations
from becoming law).
152. Compare THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF
THE UNITED STATES 106-07 (2d ed. 1979) (arguing that the federal government in
the latter part of the twentieth century is characterized by congressional delega-
tion of decision making authority to executive branch agencies with, implicitly,
little congressional oversight), and NISKANEN, supra note 149, at 29-30 (arguing
that for a variety of reasons, the sponsor of a bureau-such as Congress for an ex-
ecutive branch agency-usually exercises minimal oversight over that bureau's ac-
tions), with Randall L. Calvert et al., A Theory of Political Control of Agency Discre-
tion, 33 AM. J. POL. Scl. 588, 605-08 (1989) (based on a model of agency action,
concluding that through a variety of mechanisms Congress-and the President-
exercise significant control over executive branch agency actions), and Matthew
D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Ar-
rangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 440-44 (1989)
520
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nisms, including fine-tuned legislation, legislative member and staff communi-
cations with agency personnel, oversight hearings, budget setting, agency struc-
turing, and congressionally ordered investigations and reports, Congress can
certainly influence agency actions.'
Members of the executive branch may in turn influence legislative actions
and agendas. There are the obvious methods, such as the President's power to
veto (and threaten to veto) legislation.1 4 The President and other executive
branch officials and employees also have more subtle methods, including rec-
ommending legislation, using the bully pulpit of their offices to influence public
opinion about pending legislation, and providing testimony and other informa-
tion to Congress.'55
The one limited exception to this general cross-branch influence is mem-
bers of the judicial branch. While they have the ability to affect both legislative
branch and executive branch actions, that ability is usually only available and
exercised ex post. So, for example, the courts may rule on the constitutionality
of an enacted legislative provision, the reasonableness of a completed agency
rulemaking, or the appropriateness of a final agency determination. But aside
from a few special situations-the recent attempts by federal judges to obtain
higher salaries, for example-judges are not directly involved in legislative or
executive branch activities before a final action or lawmaking, or at least no
(arguing that Congress can effectively exercise ex ante control over an agency's
policies through mandating the agency's structure and procedures). See generally
JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE To
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 123-30 (1997) (assessing the evidence of Congress and other
political players' influence on executive branch agency procedures and concluding
that none of the major theories for the role of such influence is conclusively sup-
ported).
153. See JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRES-
SIONAL OVERSIGHT 130-34 (1990) (listing various ways Congress oversees execu-
tive branch activities); CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, JR., SIGNALS FROM THE HILL:
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL REGULATION 11-18
(1988) (discussing same); CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERN-
MENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 213-20 (3d ed. 2003) (listing vari-
ous ways that Congress oversees agency rulemaking).
154. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
155. See Vasan Kesavan & J. Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-in-Chief, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1, 63-64 (2002) (describing how the President's constitutional roles of report-
ing on the State of the Union to Congress and recommending legislation involve
the President in the legislative process); Kathryn Marie Dessayer, Note, The First
Word: The President's Place in "Legislative History," 89 MICH. L. REV. 399, 404-13
(199o) (describing the various ways that the President can influence the legislative
process).
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more so than ordinary citizens. 56 In fact, judicial political activity is more con-
strained than a typical citizen by the need to preserve both their impartiality
and appearance of impartiality.'5
7
Given the ability of government actors to influence government actions in
different branches of government, the most important question for interest
groups and those concerned about their influence is therefore what actually in-
fluences government actors, regardless of the government action at issue. Here
the existing scholarship has developed a relatively clear picture with respect to
legislators and a somewhat less clear picture with respect to the judicial branch
and to executive branch officials and employees.
1. The Legislative Branch
Legislators and, by extension, their staffs, have their actions shaped by a
number of different but interrelated preferences: their personally desired policy
results, which usually includes results that further their ideological goals and/or
their view of the public interest; the policy results preferred by those they repre-
sent; a desire for power and authority within the legislature; a desire to be re-
elected; and more self-interested desires, such as to become wealthy, to become
publicly recognized, and so on.' Interest groups can and do try to affect legisla-
tors by using all of these pressure points to achieve their desired goals.'5 9
156. See JOHN G. ROBERTS, 2006 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1
(2007), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/20o6year-endreport
.pdf (addressing only a single issue, the failure to raise judicial pay).
157. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES, Canon 4 (2000), http://www.us-
courts.gov/guide/vol2/chi.html (explicitly permitting federal judges to engage in
law-related activities, including consulting with executive or legislative officials,
but only as long as doing so would not cast reasonable doubt on the judge's im-
partiality); id. Canon 5A & 5B (requiring that judges' ability to speak on non-legal
subjects and participate in civic and charitable activities be consistent with the
dignity of the judge's office, the performance of the judge's duties, and the need to
be and appear to be impartial); id. Canon 7 (prohibiting federal judges from pub-
licly supporting candidates for public office).
158. See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 29, at 33 (concluding, after reviewing the
existing political science and economic literature regarding legislative conduct,
that constituent interests, special interest groups, and ideology all influence such
conduct); Margaret F. Brinig, The Public Choice of Driving Competence Regula-
tionS, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 405, 430 (2007) (noting that pub-
lic choice scholars have generally found that legislators are influenced by their
voting public, their own preferences, and the interest groups that support their re-
election campaigns); Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Uni-
tary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 59-60 (1995) (noting that members of Congress
serve their party colleagues as well as the voting public in their districts or states);
Nancy J. Knauer, How Charitable Organizations Influence Federal Tax Policy:
"Rent-Seeking" Charities or Virtuous Politicians?, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 971, 1031 (1996)
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More specifically, interest groups may try either to convince a legislator that
the group's position matches the legislator's personal policy preferences or to
shift those preferences to better align with the group's preferences. As critically,
groups also try to convince the legislator that their position is important
enough to deserve the legislator's limited attention. 6 Interest groups also try to
convince the legislator's constituents that the group's position should be pre-
ferred by them and, if they are successful, the groups then try to communicate
that preference to the legislator.6 Interest groups may also influence other leg-
islators, who can put pressure upon the targeted legislator in various ways. 6
(noting but not resolving the conflict between the "public choice" self-interested
politician model and the "public interest" public-spirited politician model); Mi-
chael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest and the
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 193 (1990) (developing
a model of government actor behavior that predicts that government actors will
reject interest group pressures in favor of either personal policy preferences or
what the public views as being in the general interest depending on whether an is-
sue is high on the public agenda (which would favor the general interest) and
whether the perceived benefits of pursuing their personal policy preferences out-
weigh whatever benefits the relevant interest groups can provide (which deter-
mines which set of preferences prevails in situations where issues are not high on
the public agenda)).
159. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. BERRY, LOBBYING FOR THE PEOPLE: THE POLITICAL BEHAV-
IOR OF PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS 212-52 (1977) (describing the various lobbying
tactics used by charities); Clyde Wilcox, The Dynamics of Lobbying on the Hill, in
THE INTEREST GROUP CONNECTION: ELECTIONEERING, LOBBYING, AND POLICY-
MAKING IN WASHINGTON 89, 90-98 (1998) (describing the various tactics used by
interest groups to influence congressional action).
16o. See BERRY, supra note 159, at 216-18, 222-23, 269 (noting that lobbyists tend to fo-
cus their efforts on legislators who already agree with their position, leaving policy
"enemies" alone); BERRY & WILCOX, supra note 2, at 99 (noting that legislators
and their aides tend to be impatient and that therefore a lobbyist's credibility and
factual accuracy are key to his or her getting results); Wilcox, supra note 159, at 91
(noting that lobbyists will usually not bother attempting to contact legislators
with strong or pronounced ties to the opposing position or industry).
161. See BERRY, supra note 159, at 233-38, 243-50, 269-70 (noting that forty-seven per-
cent of surveyed lobbyists view constituency-based letter-writing campaigns as
"an effective tool"); BERRY & WILCOX, supra note 2, at 115-22 (noting that lobbyists
view support from a legislator's constituents as making their task easier); Wilcox,
supra note 159, at 96-98 (noting that constituency-based lobbying contains an
"implicit threat" that the interest group will work against the targeted legislator's
reelection if he or she does not support the lobbyist's position). See generally KEN
KOLLMAN, OUTSIDE LOBBYING: PUBLIC OPINION AND INTEREST GROUP STRATE-
GIES (1998) (describing constituency-based lobbying by interest groups).
162. See BERRY & WILCOX, supra note 2, at 133 (noting the power of even a single
committee member to secure valuable earmarks for other legislators).
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Interest groups also provide needed campaign financing and reelection support
such as individual and bundled campaign contributions, campaign volunteers,
campaign-related advertising, and voter mobilization efforts-not to mention
wielding the threat of electoral opposition . 6 3 Finally, interest groups also have
historically sought to appeal to less high-minded personal preferences by pro-
viding lavish gifts, lucrative honoraria, desirable social connections, comfort-
able post-government service positions, and even pleasant companionship.6 4
The importance of these latter tools has diminished, however, with increased
163. See, e.g., BERRY & WILCOX, supra note 2, at 74-94 (describing the role of interest
groups in elections for public office); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III, at
475 (2003) (same); Marian Currinder et al., Interest Group Money in Elections, in
INTEREST GROUP POLITICS, supra note 5, at 182, 193-201 (same). Under some theo-
ries, reelection is essentially the only goal for legislators and so aiding reelection
presumably is the primary method by which interest groups wield political influ-
ence. See, e.g., DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 5-6
(1974) (assuming this to be the case and concluding that this assumption both
"fits political reality rather well" and helps better understand the legislative proc-
ess); MUELLER, supra, at 494 (noting the ongoing academic disagreement over
whether a representative's ideology or the ideology of her constituents affects her
actions, or only economic concerns (i.e., primarily campaign contributions));
Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 149, at 564-65 & nn. 69, 71 (noting that under pub-
lic choice theory, the primary goal of legislators is their own reelection and citing
sources). While such theories may lead to greater understanding of legislative mo-
tivations, they are almost certainly inaccurate if taken to the extreme of excluding
all other possible motivations. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. The fact
that at the federal level billions of dollars are spent on direct lobbying efforts alone
(not including campaign contributions and other reelection support) supports
this conclusion-at least if interest groups are being rational in their financial in-
vestments. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
164. See HERRING, supra note 3, at 38-40 (documenting the giving and witholding of
gifts and social invitations to influence legislators); Logan & Patten, supra note 3,
at 52 (identifying social lobbying as having "its place in the important methods" of
lobbying); Thomas M. Susman, Lobbying in the 21st Century: Reciprocity and the
Need for Reform, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 737, 747-49 (2006) (explaining how psycho-
logical studies indicate that even relatively small favors can trigger a sense of obli-
gation on behalf of the recipients of those favors and arguing that therefore even
small gifts and favors from lobbyists may influence the actions of legislators, de-
spite the self-serving denials of members of Congress). Concerns about the effect
of even small gifts and favors are not limited to the lobbying context. See, e.g., Da-
na Katz et al., All Gifts Large & Small, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 39 (2003) (applying simi-
lar research to the giving of gifts by drug companies to physicians and arguing
that physicians are in fact influenced by such gifts); James Westphal & Michael
Clement, Sociopolitical Dynamics in Relations Between Top Managers and Security
Analysts, ACAD. MGMT. J. (forthcoming) (studying how favors provided by com-
pany executives, such as providing useful contacts and helping to obtain country
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regulation and even prohibition of many of these methods, as well as less public
tolerance for accepting the few personal favors that are still permitted. 6 '
This is not to say that interest groups are always successful in their attempts
to influence legislators. They face competition from other interest groups with
different goals. 66 In some circumstances, legislators may even be able to play
interest groups off against each other while extracting significant benefits, such
as campaign contributions, from all the groups involved. 6 While the influence
of interest groups will vary both across issues and across different legislators,
there is little doubt that these pressure points exist and are used by interest
groups, sometimes to significant effect.'68
165. See supra Subsection I.A.3. Despite these laws, such efforts have not completely
disappeared. See, e.g., Philip Shenon, Federal Lawmakers from Coast to Coast Are
Under Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2007, at A16 (reporting on pending in-
vestigations of more than a dozen current and former members of Congress, most
related to alleged financial benefits provided by lobbyists or interest groups); 60
Minutes: Under the Influence (CBS television broadcast Apr. 1, 2007), http://www.
cbsnews.com/stories/2007/o3/29/6ominutes/main26253o5.shtml (noting that fif-
teen government officials and employees involved with the passage of the Medi-
care prescription drug bill in 2003, including congressional staffers and members,
are now employed by the pharmaceutical industry).
166. See BERRY & WILCOX, supra note 2, at 177-78 (arguing that even business interests
often have competing policy positions); Sean Nicholson-Crotty & Jill Nicholson-
Crotty, Interest Group Influence on Managerial Priorities in Public Organizations, 14
J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 571, 572 (2004) (listing studies indicating the rise of
competing interest groups); Beth L. Leech et al., Does Money Buy Power?: Interest
Group Resources and Policy Outcomes 29-31 (Apr. 12, 2007) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author and available at http://lobby.la.psu.edu/-document
ation/MPSA_2007_DoesMoneyBuyPower.pdf) (noting the competitive nature
of current interest group lobbying).
167. See McCaffery & Cohen, supra note 29, 1172-74 (arguing for an ex ante rent-
extraction model in which legislators extract campaign contributions and other
support by using their agenda-setting powers to cause interest groups to flourish).
168. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE NEW LIBERALISM: THE RISING POWER OF CITI-
ZEN GROUPS 62-76 (1999) (describing the interplay of forces affecting the congres-
sional agenda, which include but are not limited to interest groups); FARBER &
FRICKEY, supra note 29, at 17 (acknowledging that legislators are in fact influenced
by interest groups, while arguing that they also have some autonomy); Nicholson-
Crotty & Nicholson-Crotty, supra note 166, at 571 (noting that "most authors con-
clude that interest groups exercise a non-trivial degree of influence over decision
making in public organizations").
This more recent scholarship is in contrast to earlier approaches that assumed
at least legislative decisions were almost completely dictated by interest groups, as
opposed to the more recent view that interest groups represent only one of several
sources of influence over such decisions. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of
Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 158 Q.J. EcoN. 371, 372
(1983) ("Politicians, political parties, and voters will receive little attention because
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2. The Executive Branch
The President and other senior executive branch officials appear to respond
to similar pressures. Senior executive branch officials have, of course, their per-
sonal policy preferences., 69 They are also concerned with the views of their con-
stituents, although here their constituency is the entire nation and not a geo-
graphic or interest-based subset.' The President does not need the support of
the entire electorate to win a second term, and so presumably he or she and
other senior executive branch officials primarily will be concerned with the in-
terests of those groups that form part of the President's electoral coalition.'7" Se-
nior executive branch officials are also motivated by prestige and power within
the executive branch. And they are certainly susceptible to purely self-interested
concerns, although current laws limit the ability of interest groups to use this
they are assumed mainly to transmit the pressure of active groups."); Levine &
Forrence, supra note 158, at 169 (noting the dominance of the theory that govern-
ment actors pursue purely self-interested goals, including job retention (i.e., re-
election for elected officials and those dependent on their reelection), pursuit and
exercise of power, and perhaps post-government service personal wealth, which
are satisfied by interest groups that then effectively control their actions); Jona-
than R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpre-
tation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 223 (1986) (noting the
commonly held perception that the legislative process serves primarily the inter-
ests of private groups, at the expense of the public interest generally).
169. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 29, at 24 (noting the importance of ideology to
politicians such as Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher); Todd J. Zywicki, Envi-
ronmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of Envi-
ronmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845, 893 (1999) (acknowledging
that many government regulators are drawn to their positions by a sense of mis-
sion).
170. See MASHAW, supra note 152, at 152 (noting that Congress's broad delegation of
authority to executive branch administrators may improve the responsiveness of
the government to the desires of the general electorate given that Presidents are
accountable to and elected by a national constituency); Calabresi, supra note 158,
at 59 (noting that the President, uniquely in the federal system, is "accountable to
a national voting electorate and no one else"); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein,
The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 105-o6 (1994) (arguing
that presidential control over executive branch agencies tends to counter interest
group influence because of the President's national constituency).
171. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 149, at 566-67 (noting that at least first-term Presi-
dents are motivated by reelection concerns); cf RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME
STYLE: HousE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 8-10, 215, 225-26, 233-34 (1978) (de-
scribing the importance of the "reelection constituency" to members of the House
of Representatives and the resulting lesser importance of individuals and groups
who fall outside of that constituency).
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particular lever." 2 Finally, one common and very personal concern for everyone
except the President and perhaps the Vice President is securing employment
after leaving government (i.e., the revolving door).'
Lower-level executive branch officials and employees, however, are influ-
enced by a different set of concerns. The line is usually drawn roughly between,
on the one hand, presidential appointees and positions that are exempt from
civil service competition and termination rules, and, on the other, career civil
servants who enjoy typical civil service protections. 7 4 Scholars have argued that
both types of bureaucrats desire, at a minimum, to maintain their current posi-
tion and to maximize their authority.75 They may also seek to maximize both
their agency's discretionary budget as well as its relative power . 6 Such goals re-
172. See supra Subsection I.A.3.
173. See, e.g., BERRY & WILCOX, supra note 2, at 104-05 (describing recent revolving
door activity); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 87, at 50-51 (re-
commending the extension of limitations on negotiating future employment
while still in government service from just executive branch employees to legisla-
tive and judicial employees as well); id. at 62-63 (recommending creating two-year
post-employment bar on sharing non-public information by legislative and ex-
ecutive branch employees as part of lobbying effort); Saul Levmore, Efficiency and
Conspiracy: Conflicts of Interest, Anti-Nepotism Rules, and Separation Strategies, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 2099, 2101 (1998) (noting the limited reach of anti-revolving-
door provisions, including the fact they completely ignore the issue of whether
private sector employees moving into government may favor their previous col-
leagues); Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 149, at 567-68 (noting that for non-career
administrators, seeking lucrative post-government employment is an important
concern).
174. BERRY & WILCOX, supra note 2, at 136 (distinguishing between presidential ap-
pointees, who usually reflect and often have a mandate to implement the Presi-
dent's ideological agenda and share the President's reelection and other political
concerns, with career civil servants who are more insulated from constituency
pressures and often view themselves as technocrats); see also NISKANEN, supra
note 149, at 22 (using the term "bureaucrat" to mean a "senior official of any bu-
reau with a separate identifiable budget," although also discounting the distinc-
tion between temporarily appointed and career bureaucrats).
175. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 149, at 567-68.
176. See, e.g., THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISALS AND EVIDENCE 81
(Andr6 Blais & Stephan6 Dion eds., 1991) (concluding that there is continuing evi-
dence that bureaucrats seek to maximize their discretionary resources and possi-
bly their overall budgets as well); NISKANEN, supra note 149, at 38-41 (asserting a
theory that bureaucrats seek to maximize their agencies' budgets because doing so
increases the bureaucrats' personal utility, which depends on salary, perquisites of
office, public reputation, bureau output, ease of making changes, and ease of
managing the bureau); Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation,
68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 37-62 (1982) (treating in depth the ways in which collective
action often has very little to do with the actual public welfare).
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quire, of course, legislative and sometimes public support. '77 The need for such
support can provide an avenue for interest group influence, as interest groups
are often able to affect congressional budget decisions.' At the same time, as
was the case with legislators, executive branch officials may be able to play
competing interest groups against one another to achieve the officials' own
goals.
79
The idea that executive branch officials and employees view maximizing
their agency's budget as in their self-interest, however, is not universally ac-
cepted, particularly when it comes to lower-level, career civil servants.' ° Such
employees may instead be more concerned about their long-term reputation
within the government and so may feel constrained to avoid anything that
would suggest they are anything other than neutral.' 8' This need to avoid the
perception of partiality to any particular interest group is reinforced by the pro-
cedures and oversight that govern most agency actions and which expose many
agency decisions to both public view and comment by a range of interest
177. See, e.g., KENNETH J. MEIER, POLITICS AND THE BUREAUCRACY: POLICYMAKING IN
THE FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 52 (4 th ed. 2000) (noting the influence of
public opinion on executive branch agency decisions, but also noting both that
the extent of that influence is debated and that the possibility of rapid changes in
public opinion make it an unreliable source of support).
178. See, e.g., MEIER, supra note 177, at 55 (summarizing studies demonstrating the
ability of interest group and public support to increase or, in the face of budget
cuts, protect agency budgets); Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 149, at 569 (noting
that agencies are dependent upon Congress for their budgets and grants of juris-
dictional authority).
179. See, e.g., PETER H. ARANSON, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: STRATEGY AND CHOICE
485-86 (1981) (noting the complex interactions between bureaucrats and interest
groups, including the possible manipulation of interest groups by bureaucrats).
18o. See, e.g., THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT, supra note 176, at 52 (conclud-
ing that the existing evidence indicates that there is little relationship between the
salaries and promotions of career civil servants and the budgets of their agencies);
MUELLER, supra note 163, at 359-85 (summarizing the scholarship relating to gov-
ernment bureaucrat motivations, but ultimately concluding that more empirical
work is needed); Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional
Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 916, 932-34 (2005) (arguing that career bureaucrats may
have significant goals other than maximizing their agencies' budgets, including
maximizing their discretionary budget, maximizing their inactivity and leisure,
and maximizing accomplishment of the agency's specific mission, and that even
pursuit of a maximized budget is tempered by the influence of their political ap-
pointee principals, Congress, and outside interests).
181. See BERRY & WILCOX, supra note 2, at 97-98 (describing how civil servants may
"feel constricted" when dealing with lobbyists because of the need to maintain an
appearance of neutrality and formal rules limiting ex parte contacts in some cir-
cumstances).
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groups.s2 There is therefore also an institutional restraint, particularly for ca-
reer civil servants, on the extent of any particular interest group's influence.
This restraint is particularly strong for certain executive branch employees, such
as administrative law judges, who enjoy additional protections to ensure their
impartiality./s3
3. The Judicial Branch
As for the judiciary, the research regarding judges' motivations reveals a
very different picture . 4 It is generally agreed that interest groups of all stripes
also use the courts to pursue their political agendas. 1s5 But life-tenured federal
182. See BERRY & WILCOX, supra note 2, at 135 (noting that the rulemaking notice and
comment process is designed to facilitate public input, although interest groups
often also successfully try to become part of the actual drafting process); KERWIN,
supra note 153, at 73-84 (describing the procedural requirements for agency rule-
making); Pablo T. Spiller, Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-
Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or "Let Them Be Bribed," 33 J.L. & ECON.
65, 68-69 (199o); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1790-18OO (1975) (advocating several administrative
reform measures, including popular election of agency officials, selection of cer-
tain agency officials by interest groups, and increased judicial oversight of admin-
istrative agencies); Peter L. Strauss, Speech, From Expertise to Politics: The Trans-
formation of American Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 750-72 (1996)
(describing the growth in formal oversight of agency rulemaking); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 177, 198-99
(noting that one of the central purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act's
standard for administrative decision making is to ensure that agency decisions are
not simply the result of interest group pressures); Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-
Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 292-93 (1986)
(arguing for the importance of nonjudicial review mechanisms for administrative
decisions); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business?
Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128 (2006)
(noting that there is empirical evidence that the Administrative Procedure Act has
opened the door for non-business and governmental interest groups to comment
on agency rulemaking, but concluding that business groups usually still dominate
such rulemaking).
183. See, e.g., James E. Moliterno, The Administrative Judiciary's Independence Myth, 41
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1191, 1220-25 (2006) (describing the limited protections for
administrative law judges, which exceed those for other executive branch employ-
ees but are less than those for Article III judges).
184. See, e.g., Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 149, at 565 & n.72 (noting that the inter-
ests of federal judges have been much more difficult to model and citing sources).
185. See, e.g., BERRY, supra note 159, at 225-26 (noting that interest groups tend to initi-
ate litigation only as a last resort, after an unsuccessful advocacy attempt before a
government agency); BERRY & WILCOX, supra note 2, at 140-43 (describing recent
uses of the courts). See generally PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND IN-
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judges lack reelection, job retention, and, usually, promotion concerns, and so
appear to be primarily motivated by other preferences that are not easily satis-
fied by interest groups.' 6 Those other preferences appear to include reducing
the less-interesting part of their workloads, improving their reputations, and
pursuing their personal ideological agendas.'1 It is assumed, therefore, that life-
tenured, Article III federal judges are immune to interest group influence, ex-
cept through the well-accepted and public route of filing legal briefs in pending
STITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (Burton A. Weisbrod et al. eds., 1978) (describing and
analyzing the use of litigation and the courts to achieve public policy goals). For
example, amicus briefs may have a significant effect on the Supreme Court's
agenda. See Gregory Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda
Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1109 (1988) (concluding
based on data from the 1982 term that amicus curiae briefs filed by interest
groups, whether in support of or, to a lesser extent, in opposition to the grant of
certiorari, significantly and positively increased the chance of such a grant); Greg-
ory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, The Discuss List: Agenda Building in the Supreme
Court, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 807 (1990) (reaching a similar conclusion, based on
the same data, with respect to which cases are chosen by the Court for the "discuss
list"); Kevin T. McGuire & Gregory A. Caldeira, Lawyers, Organized Interests, and
the Law of Obscenity: Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court, 87 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
716, 722-23 (1993) (concluding based on data from 1955 through 1987 that in cases
involving obscenity laws amicus curiae briefs filed by interest groups in support of
granting certiorari significantly and positively increased the chance of such a
grant).
186. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 149, at 565-66 (noting that judges, especially life-
tenured federal judges, lack both the reelection motivation and probably the de-
sire to expand their authority (which could easily lead to more work but no sig-
nificant benefits)). But see Calabresi, supra note 158, at 60-62 (arguing that federal
judges are subject to influence by state or local political bases because of the po-
litical mechanism for their selection and promotion).
187. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 9-10 (1998)
(developing and providing evidence for a "strategic account" of judicial deci-
sionmaking at the Supreme Court level which concludes that the Justices are pri-
marily motivated by their personal policy preferences, but in seeking to see those
preferences fulfilled they make strategic choices based on "the preferences of other
actors, the choices they expect others to make, and the institutional context in
which they act"); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 430-35 (2002) (concluding that deci-
sions of the Justices are primarily driven by their personal ideological prefer-
ences); Levinson, supra note 18o, at 961-62 (noting that the limited existing schol-
arship indicates that life-tenured federal judges are motivated by some
combination of reducing their less-interesting workload, enhancing their reputa-
tions, and following their ideological preferences); Merrill, supra note 149, at 975
(noting that if judges are primarily motivated by the desire to make "correct" de-
cisions, then expenditures for attempting to influence judges will likely hit a point
of sharply diminishing returns much sooner than for institutional actors, such as
legislators, that have other motivations (e.g., reelection)).
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cases.' The sharp procedural limits on the courts, including the constitutional
requirement of an actual case or controversy, limitations on ex parte contacts,
and public availability of court filings, further limit interest group influence.
4. Conclusion
The existing research reveals that interest groups can and do take advantage
of a range of motivations of government actors. The strength of the these pres-
sure points depends not only on the government official involved, but also on
the particular policy issues at stake. Particular policy issues are vulnerable to in-
terest group pressure depending on the extent to which the issue is publicly
prominent and whether it stimulates strong ideological positions (by govern-
ment actors or the public).,8 9 For example, a firmly committed ideologue with a
secure congressional seat-for example, Ron Paul, the libertarian-oriented can-
didate for the Republican presidential nomination in 2008-feels interest group
pressure differently than a moderate, freshman member of Congress in a swing
district-for example, many of the new, as of 2006, Democratic members of the
House of Representatives 9 Nevertheless, some generalizations can be made.
First, all government actors share some motivations. All are to some extent
driven by their personal policy or ideological preferences, although the influ-
ence of these preferences will vary depending on the strength of other concerns.
All government actors are also vulnerable to being influenced by gifts and other
personal favors, although current laws sharply limit their ability to receive such
188. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 29, 63 (1985) (stating that courts review administrative decisions to ensure
they are not mere responses to political pressures, apparently assuming that the
courts are sufficiently shielded from such pressures). But see KOMESAR, supra note
149, at 125 (noting that judges are actually, in one respect, less independent than
average citizens, in that judges must wait for a lawsuit to be filed and evidence to
be heard before they may form an opinion about or comment upon a particular
administrative decision); Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory Justify
Judicial Activism After All?, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 219 (1997) (arguing that
courts are not immune from interest group influence, although in some circums-
tances they may be less susceptible to such influences). This assumption may very
well not apply to elected state court judges, however. See infra note 284 and ac-
companying text.
189. See generally Vincent Di Lorenzo, Legislative Chaos: An Exploratory Study, 12 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 425 (1994) (suggesting that given these variations, including across
both individual legislators and issues, a form of chaos theory should be applied to
legislative decisions making).
19o. See FENNO, supra note 171, at 221 (describing how among eighteen members of the
House of Representatives studied during the 197os, the strength of reelection con-
cerns varied in comparison to other concerns, such as influence in the House).
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favors legally. For this reason, government actors cannot be easily distinguished
on these grounds.
Second, legislators, their staffs, the President, Vice President, and those de-
pendent on them for their positions in the executive branch are concerned
about reelection. These reelection-sensitive government officials are thus af-
fected both by the views of their constituencies and by the resources available to
aid their campaigns, although this latter concern is more muted for the execu-
tive branch side, particularly in a President's second term, unless the President
hopes to influence the election of his or her successor or party allies. These re-
election-sensitive officials are also concerned about post-government service
employment opportunities, since many of them do not have permanent gov-
ernment careers. And they are concerned about increasing their own power and
authority, which to a significant extent is dependent on their legislative col-
leagues (for legislators) and the legislature generally (for executive branch offi-
cials).
Third, such motivations distinguish these high-level officials from career
civil servants and judicial branch officials and employees. These latter govern-
ment actors are insulated by civil service protections or Article III from election
concerns. They also are less vulnerable to revolving door concerns in that their
government careers are often their only career or their last career. Furthermore,
their job security and authority are usually less directly affected by legislative
actions, either because for most career civil servants their salaries and any budg-
ets they may control are set primarily by internal agency processes and not ex-
plicit congressional action and, for the judicial branch, their salaries are consti-
tutionally protected and their other common motivations are not easily subject
to interest group manipulation through legislative or executive branch actions.
These differences are reinforced by institutional procedures that limit the ability
of interest groups to influence such government actors.
These differences will be important in developing one or more definitions
of lobbying that match these data. But first a separate issue must be addressed:
whether different types of interest groups differ with respect to the kind or ef-
fectiveness of the pressures they bring to bear.
B. The Relative Influence of Different Types of Interest Groups
All interest groups are not alike. Defined most broadly, they can range from
groups with single-issue agendas and limited public or financial support (e.g.,
the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws) to groups with
broad, multi-pronged agendas and deep financial and public support (e.g., the
AARP). Interest groups may also include political parties and governments. 91
191. See BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 2, at xxii (defining interest group broadly
to include any "organization or institution that makes policy-related appeals to
the government"); id. at 25-30 (noting the broad range of definitions for "interest
group" used by scholars); BERRY & WILCOX, supra note 2, at 4-5 & n.9 (noting that
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But for reasons that will become clear, scholars and others have usually differ-
entiated between groups not on the basis of the narrowness or breadth of their
policy agendas, but on their relative financial resources and ability to organize.
More specifically, commentators have sought to distinguish the influence of
business interest groups from those of other interest groups, particularly chari-
ties.'92 For example, many scholars have argued that the tax rules governing
lobbying and political involvement should be altered to bring the influence of
charities into parity with that of business groups.'93 Some of these arguments
at the simplest level, an interest group is an organization that tries to influence
government, including other levels of government); Peter H. Schuck, Against (and
for) Madison: An Essay in Praise of Factions, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 553, 557-59
(1997) (noting that a "special interest" can include both groups with relatively
narrow economic ideological agendas and groups with very broad agendas, in-
cluding political parties and governments). Some scholars do not even require
that "groups" be organized in any formal sense, see BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, sU-
pra note 2, at 26-27, although that broad a definition is not used in this Article be-
cause the legal rules governing lobbying necessarily only apply to groups that have
a sufficient legal existence to both be subject to the rules and to control financial
resources.
192. As stated in note 40, for purposes of this Article the term "charities" will be used
to refer to organizations that qualify for tax-exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
(2000). Another possible distinction could be made between those groups whose
members share common business or occupational interests (e.g., the American
Bar Association) and groups that advocate around issues not linked by such inter-
ests. BERRY, supra note 168, at 2 & n.1 (labeling the latter "citizens groups"); see al-
so Leech et al., supra note 166, at 16 & n.8 (using this distinction).
193. See, e.g., BERRY & WILCOX, supra note 2, at 11 (describing attempts to make the
pluralism vision of politics a reality by supporting the formation of interest
groups for the previously disenfranchised and underrepresented); id. at 171-78
(describing disproportionate influence of businesses, or at least big businesses).
See generally FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 29, at 36-37 (noting the concern re-
garding interest groups that not everyone is equally represented by such groups).
Similar arguments have been made to justify the differing treatment of lobbying
by private foundations (prohibited) and public charities (permitted as an insub-
stantial activity). E.g., Comm'n on Philanthropy and Pub. Needs, Limitations on
Lobbying by Charitable Organizations, in 5 RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE
COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS 2945, 2953 (1977)
(arguing that both charities and private foundations can become the conduits for
the personal political preferences of individuals, which justifies the prohibition on
lobbying by foundations and the limit on lobbying by other charities); Jeffrey
Hart, Foundations and Social Activism: A Critical View, in THE FUTURE OF FOUN-
DATIONS 43, 47 (Fritz F. Heimann ed., 1973) (criticizing private foundations "as a
kind of shadow government" that "are not responsible to any electorate" and that
"are undertaking these [political] activities with public money"). But see Galston,
supra note io, at 1305 (arguing that it is questionable whether the differing treat-
ment of private foundations and public charities with respect to lobbying truly
creates a level playing field); John G. Simon, Foundations and Public Controversy:
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arose during the period when businesses could deduct their direct lobbying ex-
penditures and so are less compelling today. 194 But those arguments certainly
have not been limited to tax parity concerns, and instead have in large part been
driven by the financial and organizational advantages that businesses enjoy over
other types of interest groups.' 9
Evidence that this distinction is justified is not completely compelling,
however. It is true that Mancur Olson's groundbreaking 1965 insight appears to
still be true today: groups with relatively few members, such as industry-specific
business groups, have a substantial organizational advantage over groups with a
much larger number of members. 6 Recent studies also confirm that businesses
(and occupational organizations such as the American Bar Association), taken
as a group, have a clear advantage over other types of interest groups with re-
spect to material resources. 97 But surprisingly, these studies also indicate that
these advantages in organizational ability and material resources often provide
An Affirmative View, in THE FUTURE OF FOUNDATIONS, supra, at 58 (countering
arguments against the political involvement of foundations, while at the same
time proposing a number of "cautionary guidelines" for activities that might be
perceived to have a political component or effect).
194. E.g., Chisolm, supra note lo, at 250-51; Galston, supra note lo, at 1300-02.
195. E.g., Dara Z. Strolovitch, A More Level Playing Field or a New Mobilization of Bias?:
Interest Groups and Advocacy for the Disadvantaged, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS,
supra note 5, at 86, lol (concluding that despite the growth of organizations repre-
senting marginalized groups, the growth of organizations representing powerful
interests such as businesses has been greater and their power remains dominant,
although less so than in the past). See generally BERRY, supra note 168, at 9-13
(summarizing scholarship adopting the view that the interest group universe is
unbalanced because corporate business interests have inherent organizational and
financial resource advantages, but arguing that this imbalance can be significantly
reduced by stimulating "citizen group" mobilization).
196. See OLSON, supra note 23, at 141-48 (arguing that the business community is able
to generate the largest number of lobbying organizations because each industry
usually only consists of a limited number of firms so there is a relatively small
number of actors to organize into a single lobbying group); see also E.E.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF DEMOC-
RACY IN AMERICA 30-31 (1960) (suggesting that businesses tend to be well repre-
sented among interest groups in part because businesses are already highly organ-
ized as well as because of an upper-class bias in the interest group system). But see
BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 2, at 87 (acknowledging the accuracy of O1-
son's view that not all interests are able to organize, but also acknowledging that
many groups lacking the organizational advantages identified by Olson have nev-
ertheless managed to organize themselves).
197. BERRY & WILCOX, supra note 2, at 179; Leech, supra note 166, at 19-22; see also
Schuck, supra note 191, at 576-78 (noting that differences in financial resources be-
tween interest groups affect their influence, although also noting that so do differ-
ences in other, non-financial resources).
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only a weak advantage in influencing government actions.9 s Why this weak cor-
relation between these helpful characteristics and actual results? There may be a
variety of reasons.
First, well-resourced and easily organized groups may split on issues, often
resulting in a fairly even division of resources and organizational ability be-
tween each side of an issue (and at least one recent study concludes that interest
groups tend to coalesce around two, as opposed to three or more, positions
with respect to most issues).' 99 Second, non-business interest groups bring oth-
er resources to the table that business groups are not able to match and which
limit the advantage of business groups. These other resources may include pub-
lic legitimacy, as a non-business group can often more credibly state it is work-
ing for the public good and not the personal gain of its members, and also
committed members who can visit government officials, work on re-election
198. Leech, supra note 166, at 24-25. See also OLSON, supra note 23, at 145-47 (conclud-
ing that business-wide groups such as the Chamber of Commerce also have the
disadvantage of having to organize a relatively large number of actors, which hin-
ders their effectiveness as an interest group as compared to industry-specific
groups with relatively few firms as members); WILSON, supra note 147, at 311 (in
1973, noting that business-wide groups such as the Chamber of Commerce and
the National Association of Manufacturers generally only took public policy posi-
tions that enjoyed unified support among businesses). But see Strolovitch, supra
note 195, at iol (noting that the needs of even marginalized societal sectors are at
least occasionally addressed through interest group action, though ex post work in
the courts is generally more effective for such sectors than ex ante advocacy). See
generally MARK A. SMITH, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND POLITICAL POWER: PUBLIC
OPINION, ELECTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY (2000) (concluding that even when busi-
nesses unify around a single policy position, such as the adoption of a position by
the broad-based U.S. Chamber of Commerce, they are nevertheless often unable
to translate their material wealth into policy victories because the very source of
that wealth-a diverse group of business interests-leads to unity only on "busi-
ness-wide" questions-such as healthcare-that also attract the attention of the
public and other powerful, business and non-business, interest groups with con-
flicting positions).
199. See BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 2, at 97-98 (concluding that economic
diversity has led to policy splits within the business community); id. at 112-14 (cit-
ing studies supporting this conclusion); BERRY & WILCOX, supra note 2, at 178
(noting that "substantial unity [among businesses] is commonly absent"); Nichol-
son-Crotty & Nicholson-Crotty, supra note 166, at 572 (listing studies indicating
the rise of competing interest groups); Frank R. Baumgartner et al., The Structure
of Policy Conflict 17 (working paper, 20o6), available at http://lobby.la.psu.edu/
_documentation/MPSA2o6_Structure of PolicyConflict.pdf (noting both the
competitive nature of lobbying and the tendency, in the ninety-eight issue areas
studied, for different material resource-rich interest groups to be found on differ-
ent sides of each issue and for interest groups to coalesce around only two posi-
tions for each issue).
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election campaigns, and vote for or against elected officials.2"' Charities and ad-
vocacy organizations such as the NRA or the Sierra Club are most likely to have
these other advantages, while labor groups may not enjoy the same halo effect
as charities but can often deploy numerous volunteers. Third, an interest
group's priority issue may not make it onto the political agenda of even favor-
able government actors for any number of reasons; for example, other pressing
concerns (e.g., healthcare reform, Iraq) may crowd out the group's primary is-
sue, or institutional biases may work against the raising of certain issues. 1
Many of these developments, particularly the growth of effectively organized
non-business interest groups, appear to be relatively recent developments. 2
20o. BERRY, supra note 168, at 120-52 (describing the variety of resources that non-
business interest groups may have at their disposal); D.E. Apollonio, Predictors of
Interest Group Lobbying Decisions, 3 FORUM 13 (2005) (concluding that non-
financial interest group resources, such as committed members and experience,
appear to provide a substitute for (direct) lobbying expenditures); Leech, supra
note 166, at 7-8 (noting that large memberships and policy goals shared with law-
makers can counter significant material resources); see also OLSON, supra note 23,
at 132-35 (arguing that non-business groups may be able to overcome the difficulty
of mobilizing large groups of actors by organizing primarily for non-political rea-
sons, such as to engage in collective bargaining (labor unions) or to provide non-
collective goods (professional associations)). While it is true that non-business
groups such as the NAACP may have as actual members a relatively small propor-
tion of the group they purport to represent, see OLSON, supra note 23, at 142, that
small proportion can still represent hundreds of thousands of individuals. See
BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 2, at 97 (noting that non-business oriented
groups often have the advantage in terms of the numbers of potential members).
201. See Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces of Power, 56 AM. POL. ScI. REV.
947, 952 (1962) (discussing the agenda-setting influence of institutional biases);
Leech et al., supra note 166, at 35 (discussing why purported government allies
may not adopt an interest group's priorities as their own).
202. See BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 2, at 88-92, 97 (noting the growth of new,
non-business oriented interest groups and the relatively high level of involvement
by members of the public in interest groups, although only a relatively small
group of individuals are extremely active in multiple groups); id. at in (conclud-
ing that most recent studies indicate that non-business interest groups are grow-
ing in both number and influence); id. at 116-17 (noting that it remains unclear
what degree of mobilization is sufficient to matter in politics, particularly when a
relatively low proportional involvement can still translate into significant re-
sources and committed individuals for a sufficiently large latent group); BERRY,
supra note 168, at 16-33 (concluding that interest group politics changed signifi-
cantly from the 196os to the 199os because of the growing influence of ideological
citizen groups); SMITH, supra note 198, at 201-02 (noting the growth in competi-
tion among interest groups over time, particular with respect to the rise non-
business groups that opposed business-group-supported positions); WILSON, su-
pra note 147, at 341-42 (noting the declining political influence, as of 1973, of
groups organized around material interests, such as business groups); Allan J.
Cigler, Interest Groups: A Subfield in Search of an Identity, in 4 POLITICAL SCIENCE:
536
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The end result is that while business groups may remain overrepresented
among interest groups, they do not, at least today, appear to enjoy an over-
whelming advantage in actually achieving favored government action and
blocking disfavored government action.03 That said, there is some evidence that
industry-specific business interests are often able to prevail with respect to ad-
ministrative rulemaking, which focuses on narrow issues and receives less scru-
tiny from other interest groups and the public." 4
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 99, 121 (William Crotty ed., 1991) (noting that by the late
1970s a less stable public policy environment had emerged, in part because of the
increasing numbers of interest groups); Schuck, supra note 191, at 592 (noting the
apparently reduced influence of interest groups, perhaps because of increased
competition among such groups, among other factors).
That change may in turn have been driven in large part by the growth in the
number, resources, and range of positions of interest groups. See, e.g., BERRY &
WILCOX, supra note 2, at 16-20 (citing studies confirming the growth of interest
groups and their lobbying efforts); Cigler & Loomis, supra note 5, at 10-12 (same).
In contrast, studies from the first part of the 197os and earlier commonly found
both a greater dominance of business oriented groups as well as more instances of
a disproportionate alignment by interest groups on one side of particular issues.
See BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 2, at 94-96 (noting studies reporting the
dominance of business oriented groups); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice
and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by the Tax Legis-
lation in the 1980os, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 43-44 (1990) (noting studies finding inter-
est groups often on one side of an issue). The reasons for this growth are beyond
the scope of this Article, but for a summary of reasons why Olson's insights are
not always controlling, see Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regu-
lation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 564-65 (2001).
203. See supra notes 200 & 202. It could be argued that since the current public policy
status quo already favors interest groups with abundant material resources, any
defeat of attempts by those groups to make public policy even more favorable to
their interests, or to block attempts to reduce their existing advantage, still leaves
such groups with an enviable advantage. The merits of this argument would,
however, require reaching a determination that the status quo does, in fact, favor
such interests "unfairly," which is well beyond the scope of this article.
204. See SMITH, supra note 198, at 201-02 (noting that business interests may have par-
ticularly strong influence on narrow issues that are less likely to result in active
opposition to their positions); Revesz, supra note 202, at 567 (citing studies find-
ing that at least at the federal level, business interest groups participated in many
more regulatory proceedings than non-business interest groups); Webb Yackee &
Webb Yackee, supra note 182, at 135-36 (based on a study of comments on pro-
posed rules submitted to four federal agencies over eight years, concluding that it
appears businesses have an advantage over nonbusinesses in the regulatory rule-
making process, perhaps because businesses have substantial material resources
that permit them to submit more comments).
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Charities, on the other hand, may not always be pure protectors of the pub-
lic interest." 5 Some supporters of loosening the lobbying rules for charities have
therefore proposed identifying the types of charities most likely to represent
otherwise underrepresented groups and only loosening the rules for them.2°6
Another danger of more liberal rules for charities is that business interests may
find ways to take advantage of the charitable form, even though the tax laws
specifically prohibit a charitable contribution deduction if the contribution is
made to evade the denial of a business deduction for lobbying expenses. 0 7 The
extent to which such abuse of charities might occur is uncertain, however.20
And while many charities may represent interests that have other avenues for
influencing government actions, charities are the only potential avenue of rep-
resentation for many disadvantaged groups. ° 9 So there are some real differ-
205. See, e.g., Galston, supra note lo, at 1315-17 (describing, but not accepting, the view
that charities have a countermajoritarian tendency harmful to democracy, which
lobbying will only increase); Todd J. Zywicki, Baptists?: The Political Economy of
Environmental Interest Groups, 53 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 315, 349 (2002) (conclud-
ing that lobbying behavior of environmental groups is best explained as an effort
to secure government support for their point of view and to secure wealth and
power for their organizations). Of course, charities and their supporters usually
believe their positions are in the overall public interest, rightly or not. See Bruce
Yandle & Stuart Buck, Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global Warming Battle, 26
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 188-89 (2002) (equating environmentalists with Bap-
tists in the era of prohibition, who saw their position as one driven by moral ne-
cessity). But it is not unusual for business interests to also take this position, al-
though generally with less credibility; as a onetime corporate president put it,
"What's good for the country is good for General Motors, and vice versa." THE
NEW DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY 472 (E.D. Hirsch, Jr., Joseph F. Kett, &
James Trefil eds., 3d ed. 2002); see also SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 196, at 27
(using this quote as illustrating the need to explain private interests in terms of the
common public interest when engaged in public discussions).
2o6. See Chisolm, supra note lo, at 283-87, 294-95 (proposing to only liberalize the lob-
bying limitations on charities for broadly supported subset of charities that fur-
ther "charitable," as opposed to solely educational or religious, purposes).
207. See SMITH, supra note 198, at 32 (describing the funding of think tanks by business
interests to change public opinion on policy issues); Note, The Political Activity of
Think Tanks: The Case for Mandatory Contributor Disclosure, 115 HARV. L. REV.
1502, 1513-14 (2002) (describing how some think tanks classified as charities for tax
purposes have advanced the business interests of their donors).
2o8. See Galston, supra note lo, at 1334-35 (acknowledging this possibility, but noting it
is likely that wealthy interests would probably engage in a similar amount of lob-
bying even without the charity option, although through a less tax-favored and
less publicly favored vehicle).
209. See BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 2, at 92-93 (concluding that the then ex-
isting research demonstrates that individuals with higher social status are more
involved in the interest group system than those with lower social status); BERRY,
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ences between types of interest groups that may justify some difference in how
lobbying is defined for each type. But before turning to the possible definitions
there is one final question to be answered: what exact forms of interest group
influence are of concern?
C. Desirable Versus Undesirable Influence
Not all interest group influence of government actors is detrimental and so
should be constrained. Some commentators paint interest groups as ultimately
destructive to our democratic form of government, 210 but the more widely ac-
cepted and long-standing view of both scholars and lawmakers is that interest
groups provide significant benefits.2 " These benefits include supplying valuable
information and advice for government decision makers, informing citizens of
proposed and current government actions and thus increasing the transparency
of government, and creating a mechanism through which citizens can both par-
ticipate in politics generally and influence specific government actions, all of
supra note 168, at 4 (noting that the landscape of interest group politics in Wash-
ington has long been dominated by corporate and professional interests, perhaps
creating an upper-class bias); Galston, supra note io, at 1335-36 (arguing that the
potential gain to the wealthy from liberalizing the rules limiting lobbying by
charities needs to be weighed against the potential gain for the nonwealthy).
21o. E.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH,
STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 41-47 (1982) (arguing that interest groups
tend to use government to redistribute wealth from society as a whole to them-
selves); JONATHAN RAUCH, DEMOSCLEROSIS: THE SILENT KILLER OF AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 64-97 (1994) (referring to lobbyists and the groups that employ
them as part of "the parasite economy"); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Is Democracy
Like Sex?, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1635, 1642-44 (1995) (citing OLSON, supra, and RAUCH,
supra, and agreeing that interest groups are "political parasites" that "not only
pursue their own self-interested agenda, but also force others into a political 'arms
race' to protect their own interests"); see also BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note
2, at 85-86 (summarizing recent literature taking this view); BERRY, supra note 168,
at 13-14 (describing the view that interest groups corrupt democratic politics, pri-
marily by directing money to politicians one way or another, and so need to be
constrained).
211. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 2, at xv (concluding that virtually all
commentators have recognized that interest groups are a "mixed blessing"); id. at
83 (noting that the interest group system "is seen simultaneously to be a route for
popular representation and a threat to good government because of the biases
that it allows"); HERRING, supra note 3, at I (describing interest groups as a "pow-
erful medium for the highly effective expression of opinion on the part of various
elements within the body politic"); Logan & Patten, supra note 3, at 72, 78 (noting
the long-held concession that "there is some lobbying activity which is desired
and which is useful" and pointing out that lobbyists often introduce into the legis-
lative dialogue important facts or considerations "which otherwise would be over-
looked or would be beyond the legislator's capacity to acquire").
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which supports our representative form of government.212 Interest groups may
also serve to counter the tyranny of the majority-the problem that an engaged
majority can selfishly work against the interests of the minority. 13 At the same
time, however, interest groups can influence government decision making in
ways that have a significant chance of causing such decisions to no longer serve
the public interest but only to serve the interest of that particular interest
group.1 4 Methods that are particularly problematic include providing distorted
212. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 2, at 86-88 (describing the "pluralist"
view that interest groups are broadly representative of the interests of society and
play a positive role in the creation of better citizens); BERRY & WILCOX, supra note
2, at 6-8 (listing the various roles of interest groups); STEPHEN MACEDO ET AL.,
DEMOCRACY AT RISK: How POLITICAL CHOICES UNDERMINE CITIZEN PARTICI-
PATION AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 4-5 (2005) (stating that citizen in-
volvement in government, whether through interest groups or other channels, is
essential to American democracy because it provides decision makers with re-
quired information, legitimates government actions, and enhances the quality of
citizens' lives); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED IN-
TERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 297-300 (1986) (noting the role of interest
groups in providing information that legislators need to make decisions but are
often otherwise unable to obtain); David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, A Theory
of Strategic Oversight: Congress, Lobbyists, and the Bureaucracy, 11 J.L. EcON. &
ORG. 227 (1995) (concluding that interest groups provide Congress with useful in-
formation about executive branch activities, thereby aiding Congress' oversight);
Johnson, supra note io, at 9 (acknowledging the positive role of lobbyists and, by
extension, the interest groups they represent); Rogan Kersh, The Well-Informed
Lobbyist: Information and Interest Group Lobbying, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS,
supra note 5, at 389, 396-97 (describing how lobbyists gather and share informa-
tion that otherwise might not be available to government actors); Schuck, supra
note 191, at 580-88 (noting the role of interest groups in facilitating citizen partici-
pation in politics and the larger society, providing useful and needed information
to government officials and the public, and helping to define what is in fact the
public interest); see also 141 CONG. REC. 20,007 (statement of Sen. Levin) (ac-
knowledging, upon his introduction of the LDA, that "[1lobbying is part of de-
mocratic government, an inherent part of it, a constitutionally protected part of
constitutional and democratic government").
213. See KOMESAR, supra note 149, at 97 (developing a "two-force" model that recog-
nized the possibility of majoritarian influence and bias as well as minoritarian
(i.e., interest group) influence and bias).
214. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig et al., The Regulation of Lobbyists, 77 PUB. CHOICE 377,
377 (1993) (noting that a public interest view of lobbyist regulation is that such
regulation promotes legislation that takes "more account of the general welfare
and less account of private interests," while an economic model suggests that such
regulation benefits legislatures by raising the cost of lobbying and so revealing the
strength of interest group interest in particular legislation); Jody Freeman, The
Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 548-49 (2000) (contrast-
ing the view that private actors in the administrative law context are "menacing
outsiders whose influence threatens to derail legitimate 'public' pursuits" with
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facts to both government officials and the public, and providing social, finan-
cial, or political favors, including campaign support, that personally benefit
government actors.215
The exact trade-off between the positive and negative aspects of interest
group influence is a subject of much debate.216 But, given the concerns that
animate them, restrictions on such influence should reach only those activities
that create an actual or perceived danger to government decision making in the
public interest. Actions by interest groups that contribute positively to govern-
ment decision making in the public interest should not be unduly restricted, lest
that positive effect be lost.
1. The Process for Determining the Public Interest
Determining "positive" versus "negative" interest group influence requires
considering the unresolved debate about how government decision makers and
institutions determine what is in the "public interest." The current prevailing
view is that "public interest" is a procedural concept-that whatever is the re-
sult of the appropriate decision making procedure will be in the "public inter-
est" as opposed to in the interest of some sub-group to the detriment of the
general public. 7 This view, however, leaves unanswered the question of what is
their role as "regulatory resources capable of contributing to the efficacy and le-
gitimacy of administration").
215. See, e.g., BERRY, supra note 168, at 15 (noting the criticisms and benefits of interest
groups); MUELLER, supra note 163, at 496 (noting the incentives for interest
groups to provide distorted information); Johnson, supra note io, at 12 (listing
these concerns); Nicholson-Crotty & Nicholson-Crotty, supra note 166, at 572
(finding a correlation between interest group influence and access).
216. See generally FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 29, at 17-33 (reviewing the non-legal
scholarship regarding interest groups); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and
the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1055-74 (1997) (reviewing the
changing scholarly views of interest groups and their effect on judicial perceptions
of administrative agencies); Hanne B. Mawhinney, Theoretical Approaches to Un-
derstanding Interest Groups, 15 EDUC. POL'Y 187 (2001) (reviewing the major theo-
retical perspectives found in interest group scholarship, which reflect differing as-
sumptions regarding the potential threat that such groups pose to democratic
government).
217. See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 29, at 59 (arguing that a legislative decision
has a good claim to represent the public interest when the political process guides
existing preferences in a manner that reflects society's understandings about rele-
vance, equity, and majoritarian rule); Schuck, supra note 191, at 556 (noting this
procedural notion of the public interest is widely accepted today, in contrast to
the Madisonian concept of an objective public interest). But see SCHAT-
TSCHNEIDER, supra note 196, at 23-24 (defining "the public interest" as referring
"to general or common interests shared by all or by substantially all members of
the community" in contrast to private or special interests, and providing national
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the appropriate decision making process for leading to decisions that further
public, as opposed to private, interests.
Over time, scholars have developed a number of different models for how
lawmaking occurs, with each model having important implications on which
lawmaking processes promote the public interest. These models also inform our
thinking about how interest groups contribute to, or undermine, that process.
One view emphasizes the expertise, autonomy, or good faith of lawmakers, who
are seen as only needing enough accurate information and sufficiently robust
analytical tools to reach decisions that further the public interest.218 In this view,
the role of interest groups should be limited to providing needed data and tools,
and perhaps then only at the invitation of government actors who have deter-
mined that they need such items." 9 Greater involvement by interest groups is
harmful, because they use political pressure to force government actors to fur-
ther the groups' narrow interests over the public interest, and so government
actors should be insulated to a significant degree from such groups."'
The competing view is epitomized by what Professor Richard Stewart has
labeled the "interest representation" model.2 ' According to this view, the public
interest is best determined by open government actors who are responsive to
the concerns of all affected interests. 2 Interest groups therefore play a critical
and pervasive role in government decision making, formalized through pre-
lawmaking procedures for their participation and post-lawmaking rights to
challenge government actions in court. 3 While government actors need not-
survival as one such common interest); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence,
Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6
J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 167, 168 (1990) (noting that the "best" government policies
could be defined as ones that have "a primarily public or other-regarding cast, one
that goes beyond individual self-interest").
218. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 440-41 (2003) (describing the development of this "regulatory
managerialism" approach in the administrative law context).
219. Id. at 441.
220. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 214, at 558-59 (commenting on what are arguably
two versions of this model, the "public interest theories" that view private actor
participation in government decision making with suspicion because while the
concept of "'public interest' evades rigorous definition," it at a minimum means
"resisting pressure from third parties (who only have their narrow self-interest in
mind)" and "civic republican" theories that seek to insulate government decision
makers from private actors because those decision makers are supposed to pursue
"some conception of the common good"); Galston, supra note io, at 1137-39 (de-
scribing and accepting the similar "deliberative" model).
221. Stewart, supra note 182, at 1723; see also Stewart, supra note 218, at 442.
222. Freeman, supra note 214, at 559-60; Stewart, supra note 182, at 1760.
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and should not-be completely responsive to the competing interest groups,
the law should require them to actively seek and consider input from such
groups and should not impede groups from providing such input.?4
The former approach suggests the definition of lobbying for tax, disclosure,
and actor-limitation purposes should be relatively broad. Only activities that
provide government actors with needed data and tools should escape the defini-
tion. In contrast, the latter approach suggests a relatively narrow definition of
lobbying, covering only those activities that are most likely to be inconsistent
with the involvement of all affected interests in the decision making process,
while permitting all other advocacy activities to proceed unimpeded by tax, dis-
closure, or other burdens.
I believe the latter approach is preferable in this context for two reasons.
First, the existing lobbying laws do not-and almost certainly constitutionally
cannot-absolutely prevent any interest group from pursuing any particular
avenue of influence short of outright bribery. 25 These laws therefore only have
the potential to discourage whatever activities are identified as "lobbying." Fur-
thermore, the extent to which that potential is actually realized appears uncer-
tain, as there is little or no empirical research on the subject. Therefore, even if
the former view is correct, that most interest group involvement is detrimental
to the process of reaching decisions in the public interest, none of the laws at
issue here will flatly prevent such involvement or any particular type of in-
volvement, and it is not even clear that they would significantly reduce the less-
favored behavior.
Second, because these views focus on reaching decisions in the public inter-
est, they downplay or ignore the other significant benefits of relatively unim-
peded interest group involvement. Those other benefits include legitimizing
that process by providing an avenue for individuals both to learn about and
participate in government decisions and, more generally, facilitating citizen po-
litical involvement." 6 Another way to think about this point is to view the pub-
lic interest as including a participatory element as well as a results element.
Whether a government action furthers the public interest could be measured
223. Stewart, supra note 182, at 1723-60; Strauss, supra note 182, at 745-72 (describing
the historical development of these procedures and rights).
224. Freeman, supra note 214, at 56o-61 (noting that this model can be consistent with
administrative government actors exercising independent judgment regarding
what is in the public interest, although that judgment is informed by the views of
private actors; contrasting this approach with related public choice theories that
assume interest groups effectively capture government actors by appealing to
those actors' personal preferences).
225. See supra notes 20-21, 43 (listing the leading Supreme Court cases addressing the
constitutional limits on Congress' ability to regulate lobbying) and accompanying
text.
226. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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not only by its results but also by its perceived legitimacy, which is enhanced by
the ability of citizens, through interest groups, to be informed about and, if they
so choose, participate in the decision making process." 7 It is true that interest
groups do not equally represent all individuals or interests, as both business in-
terests and those with higher social status dominate the interest group uni-
verseY.28 But at least in recent years, they have come to represent a relatively
broad range of views and individuals. 9
2. Distinguishing Positive from Negative Interest Group Influence
Once we adopt the interest representation model as best capturing the po-
tential benefits and harms of interest group influence on government decision
making, we are then able to distinguish positive from negative interest group
influence. Some actions are clearly negative, because they are highly likely to
lead to government decisions that further the interests of a specific group, while
not furthering participation by all affected interest groups.23 ° Such actions in-
clude, for example, explicit trading of personal financial benefits for official ac-
tions and have been absolutely prohibited.23' Others are at least perceived as
negative, because they create the impression of such a result. Such actions in-
clude providing gifts or other personal benefits even where there is no explicit
quid pro quo and have been sharply limited if not completely banned. 32
Certain types of actions are more difficult to categorize as clearly negative
(or positive). For example, interest groups are commonly viewed as a positive
influence to the extent they convey information to government decision mak-
ers, but only if the information is conveyed through a process that is available to
other affected interest groups as well.233 For this reason, it may make sense to
227. See Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative
Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in
Land Use Decisions (Installment One), 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 36-37 (2005) (argu-
ing that in the context of land use regulation, lack of sufficient avenues for public
participation has resulted in both serious legitimacy problems for government de-
cisions and poor land use decisions).
228. See supra notes 204, 209 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
230. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 29, at 35 (rejecting the view that all government
actions providing economic benefits to a subset of the population are unjustified
since such actions may serve interests of justice and other, non-economic social
values, but conceding that some rent-seeking legislation may not be justifiable
under any theory of social justice).
231. See supra note 72.
232. See supra notes 73-77.
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distinguish, for example, between conveying information to a government actor
behind closed doors, which is less susceptible to challenge or participation by
other parties, and conveying information in a more public and more accessible
manner, such as through testimony in a congressional hearing or formal written
comments. There may be reasons unrelated to achieving an unfair advantage
for interest groups to seek closed door meetings-such as when the information
they are providing involves proprietary business strategies or revelations that
would result in possible consumer or public backlash. But none of the laws at
issue here would absolutely prohibit such meetings; they would make the costs
of such meetings greater (because of the need to pay for such costs with after-
tax dollars) and make the fact that such meetings occurred subject to disclosure.
III. DEFINING "LOBBYING"
The research summarized above is far from conclusive in many respects. It
does, however, provide us with a clearer picture of how interest groups, through
their lobbying expenditures and paid lobbyists, influence government actions
than would have been available to Congress and the Treasury Department when
they created the various definitions of lobbying in existing federal law. This is
particularly true for the tax definition applicable to most charities, which has
remained relatively unchanged since 1934.234 The LDA and the business ex-
penses definition definitions, both adopted in their current forms in the 199os,
may, however, reflect some of these research results. 35 But before we discuss
how lobbying should be defined given this research, we must first address a
threshold question: whether there should there be a single definition of lobby-
ing for purposes of the federal laws regulating that activity.
A. A Single Definition?
The lack of a uniform definition of lobbying does not appear to have been a
matter of conscious congressional choice but instead a product of the varied
histories of the relevant laws.23 6 Congress in fact asked the U.S. Government Ac-
countability Office (then named the U.S. General Accounting Office) to deter-
mine whether the definitions should be harmonized in the late 1990S.23 7
There are numerous benefits to a single definition. It would reduce the ad-
ministrative costs of complying with these various rules, and it would eliminate
the apples and oranges problem the different definitions create for comparing
234. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes oz, 116 and accompanying text.
236. See supra Section I.B.
237. GAO REPORT, supra note 88.
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reported lobbying expenditures under the different rules.23' Despite these ad-
vantages, there are two arguments for adopting multiple definitions that need
to be considered. First, lobbying rules use different methods to accomplish their
common purpose, so different definitions may fit these different methods suffi-
ciently better so as to offset the benefits of a single definition. Second, the dif-
ferences among types of interest groups may be sufficient to justify using differ-
ent definitions for different types of interest groups.
i. Do Different Rules Require Different Definitions?
Do these different ways of restricting disfavored advocacy activities require
different definitions for what is a disfavored activity (that is, what is lobbying)?
The legislative history for an earlier version of the LDA noted the definitional
difference with the tax laws but simply stated that the different purposes of the
tax laws justified a different definition without elaboration.239 But if, as asserted
above, the ultimate purposes of the tax laws and the LDA appear to be the
same-discouraging certain types of advocacy activities-this statement does
not withstand scrutiny.2 4 Rather, different definitions need to be justified by
the difference in methods used to achieve their shared purpose.
The burdens placed on lobbying by these two sets of rules are different but
share many common characteristics. Neither taxing lobbying nor requiring its
disclosure prohibits lobbying activity. While it is true that the tax laws limit the
amount of lobbying by charities, and bar it completely for private foundations,
it is now well accepted that a charity can effectively engage in unlimited lobby-
ing by creating a closely affiliated social welfare organization that receives non-
deductible contributions.2 4' For example, the Natural Resources Defense Coun-
238. This problem exists even within the LDA rules because some organizations are
given the option of using either the LDA definition or one of the tax definitions
for purposes of determining whether and to what extent they have engaged in
lobbying. See GAO REPORT, supra note 88, at 4 (concluding that harmonizing the
definitions could improve the comparability of LDA disclosure reports); Lune-
burg & Susman, supra note 10, at 50-52 (noting the comparison problem created
by the current ability of some organizations to use a tax definition of lobbying for
LDA purposes).
239. S. REP. No. 103-37, at 29 (1993) ("Unlike this bill, the Internal Revenue Code is not
primarily intended for the purpose of ensuring public disclosure, and the Com-
mittee recognizes that the different purposes of the tax laws justify a different de-
finition of lobbying.").
240. See supra Section I.B.
241. See, e.g., Ward L. Thomas & Judith E. Kindell, Affiliations Among Political, Lobby-
ing and Educational Organizations, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONs-TECHNICAL IN-
STRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 200o, at 255, 259-6o (20oo), http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-tege/eotopicsoo.pdf (stating that a charity may establish and control a so-
cial welfare organization, which may engage in a substantial amount of lobbying,
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cil, a charity, has the affiliated Natural Resources Defense Council Action Fund,
a social welfare organization; Focus on the Family, a charity, has the affiliated
Focus on the Family Action, a social welfare organization 42 The key require-
ment is that the finances and legal structures of the two entities remain distinct,
but even with this requirement the entities may share directors, officers, staffs,
and facilities as long as costs are appropriately allocated. 43
The administrative burdens imposed by each set of rules are also similar.
The tax rules require affected organizations to identify lobbying activities and
allocate expenses to those activities. 44 For charities, this requirement is neces-
sary to ensure that the charity is not violating the lobbying limit and to properly
report such expenditures on its annual information return, if it files one.2 45 In
the case of a business, this is necessary to determine what expenses are not de-
ductible4 6 For LDA purposes lobbying activities must be identified and lobby-
ing expenditures reported, although to date the figures reported have not re-
quired the exactness required by the tax laws.2 47 But a single definition would
tend to reduce, not increase, this burden, as it would permit organizations to
only have to keep track of one set of activities for both sets of laws. Congress
recognized this advantage when it permitted business and charities that choose
the optional election regime for tracking lobbying expenditures to use that defi-
nition for LDA purposes.4' By still allowing organizations to use a different,
LDA-specific definition, however, Congress created an apples and oranges
as long as the charity observes the legal formalities of the separate legal existence
of each entity).
242. See NRDC: The Earth's Best Defense, http://www.nrdc.org (last visited March 12,
20o8); NRDC's Action Center, http://www.nrdc.org/action/ (last visited March 12,
2008); Focus on the Family, http://www.family.org (last visited March 12, 2o08);
Focus on the Family Action, http://www.focusaction.org (last visited March 12,
2008).
243. Ward & Kindell, supra note 241, at 259.
244. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.162-28 (1995) (providing detailed rules for allocating costs
to lobbying activities), Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-3 (1990) (same).
245. See IRS Form 990, sched. A, pts. VI-A, VI-B (2oo6), available at http://www.irs.
gov/pub/irs-pdf/f99osa.pdf (requiring reporting by charities of lobbying expendi-
tures).
246. See IRS Instructions for Form 1120, at 12 (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-pdf/ft2o.pdf (noting that lobbying expenditures may not be included in
the deductions listed on these forms).
247. See 2 U.S.C. § 160 5 (b)( 4), (c) (2000) (requiring a good faith estimate of lobbying
expenses, rounded to the nearest $20,000).
248. See 2 U.S.C. § 161o(a), (b) (2000) (permitting this option for some entities); H.R.
REP. No. 104-339, at 23 (1995) (noting that permitting this option for charities
would allow to avoid having to maintain two sets of records of lobbying activi-
ties).
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problem when comparing LDA reports by organizations that choose to use dif-
ferent definitions. 249
In conclusion, neither differing purposes nor differing methods justify hav-
ing differing definitions. There is one respect, however, in which the tax defini-
tion(s) of lobbying should differ from the LDA and lobbyist restrictions defini-
tion(s). Any tax definition must address the question of how to treat attempts
to influence government actors or actions for governments other than the U.S.
federal government. While states and localities can and have for the most part
created their own disclosure rules for and limits on lobbyist activities, none of
these other governments has the authority to affect the federal tax rules for lob-
bying expenditures. But, as I argue below, the same basic definition that applies
at the federal level for tax, disclosure, and lobbyist restriction purposes should
also apply at the state, local, and other government levels for tax purposes since
the same concerns that exist at the federal level also exist at least with respect to
state and local governments, although with some different nuances. There is
one remaining issue relating to whether to have one or more definitions that
must first be addressed.
2. Do Different Interest Groups Require Different Definitions?
As detailed above, there is a long-standing view that different types of inter-
est groups should be subject to different restrictions with respect to lobbying in
order to create a more level playing field for those whose interests they repre-
sent. 5° This argument, which distinguishes between business-related interest
groups and charities, is not without its flaws. 5' But it is certainly true that his-
torically underrepresented segments of the population are more likely to be rep-
resented by charities, or at least non-business-related interest groups, than
business-related interest groups.2 52 And it also appears that, at least with respect
to relatively narrow governmental actions, the greater material resources of
business interests provide them with an advantage."
Even accepting that there are grounds for distinguishing among different
types of interest groups, however, the question remains whether the differences
among groups justifies a difference in the definition of lobbying. There are three
problems with creating such a distinction. The first is that it is unclear whether
a narrower definition of lobbying for charities will significantly advance the
249. See supra note 238.
250. See supra Section II.B.
251. See Galston, supra note lo, at 1339-42 (proposing a single definition of "educa-
tional advocacy lobbying" for both charities and businesses and for which busi-
nesses would be able to deduct their expenses and charities would be able to do in
an unlimited amount); supra notes 198-203, 205-207, and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
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public interest generally or the interests of historically underrepresented groups
more specifically. For example, if businesses have to treat efforts to influence
senior executive branch officials with respect to their official duties as lobbying
but charities do not, charities will still be on the same footing as businesses with
respect to legislation, just not with respect to administrative actions. Yet there is
no particular reason to believe that hearing the voices of charities is any less im-
portant with respect to legislation than it is with respect to administrative ac-
tions-if anything, the reverse may be true. And while business groups may en-
joy an advantage with respect to the narrower government actions that tend to
be more of a focus of the executive branch, it has not been demonstrated that
this advantage is somehow improper. Thus, a difference in the general defini-
tion of lobbying appears to be the wrong tool to distinguish between different
types of interest groups.
Second, it is difficult to distinguish between charities that pursue the public
interest or the interests of underrepresented groups from those that may pursue
the interests of already well-represented and established groups.254 For example,
many charities reflect business friendly views and are business funded, even if
their activities fall within the tax law definition of charitable activity. 55 Fur-
thermore, non-charitable entities, such as social welfare organizations, may also
pursue the public interest or the interests of historically underrepresented
groups, yet the tax definition of social welfare is even more elastic than the tax
definition of charitable, further complicating any attempt to differentiate inter-
est groups.56 Attempts to distinguish between different types of interest groups,
therefore, appears to be doomed to be significantly both under and over-
inclusive.
Finally, where a difference is created an incentive to exploit that difference
is created. It is already common for businesses to fund charities that are rela-
tively pro-business in their views. 7 If those charities enjoyed a significant ad-
vantage with respect to advocacy activities because they were subject to a nar-
row definition of lobbying, that practice would presumably only increase. It is
unclear how significant this regulatory arbitrage may become, but it certainly
poses a danger and undermines the basis for providing charities with a nar-
rower definition of lobbying.
For all of these reasons, the differences among interest groups does not jus-
tify having multiple definitions. A single definition is preferable for all the rules
governing lobbying, even given variations among interest groups. There is,
however, one respect where a difference may be justified. Charities are required
254. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 207.
256. See Treas. Reg. § 1.5o1(c)(4)-1(a)(2) (1990) (defining promoting social welfare as
"promoting in some way the common good and general welfare of the people of
the community").
257. See supra note 207.
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to serve the public interest, including with respect to their educational activi-
ties.258 For this reason, reports and similar publications by charities are usually
given more credence than similar documents from other sources. Congress may
have recognized this difference when it created various education-related excep-
tions to the definition of lobbying for charities that elect the optional lobbying
limitation regime but rejected those same exceptions for businesses.5 9 It is
worth considering whether this distinction should remain with respect to ex-
ceptions from the general definition of lobbying.
B. Focusing on the Action or the Actor?
Earlier definitions of lobbying focused on the type of government action
that was the target of the influence attempts.60 It was only the most recent defi-
nitions-for businesses in the tax rules and then in the LDA-that shifted the
focus in part or in whole to the type of government actor that was the target.6'
The LDA's legislative history indicates that this shift was at least in part because
of concerns about scandals involving executive branch officials, particularly the
Reagan-era Wedtech scandal. 6 As with the Abramoff scandal, the fact that the
laws in existence at the time of the scandal proved, for the most part, sufficient
to criminalize the undesirable behavior did not deter Congress from expanding
the reach of the LDA to such officials 63
This modern shift from government action to government actor is strongly
supported by the existing interest group research and the reality of how gov-
ernment operates. As noted above, both the legislative branch and the executive
branch have numerous formal and informal ways of influencing the activity of
the other branch.26 4 At the same time, vulnerability to different types of influ-
ence-including methods most likely to detract from the public interest-varies
258. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (199o) (requiring all organizations de-
scribed in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) to serve "a public rather than a private interest").
259. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
260. See supra Section I.C.
261. See supra notes 102-103, 114-116 and accompanying text.
262. 141 CONG. REc. 20,007 (1995) (statement of Sen. Levin) (citing the Wedtech scan-
dal as an example of why seeking to influence high-level executive branch officials
should be included within the scope of the LDA). The Wedtech scandal involved a
company that became a multi-million dollar military contractor by both falsely
claiming it was a minority-owned business and by bribing various government of-
ficials, including members of Congress. See generally JAMES TRAUB, Too GOOD To
BE TRUE: THE OUTLANDISH STORY OF WEDTECH (1990).
263. See TRAUB, supra note 262, at 348-63 (describing the criminal convictions that re-
sulted from the Wedtech scandal).
264. See supra notes 152-155 and accompanying text.
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primarily based on the government actor involved, not the government action
at issue. 65 It therefore makes more sense to focus on the government actor, not
the government action.
The most likely objection to a government-actor-focused definition is that
it is more difficult to administer than a government-action-focused definition.
At least at the federal level, this does not appear to be a major concern. The
LDA uses a government actor definition, yet, thanks to the specificity of that de-
finition and the detail of the federal job classification system, it is reasonably
easy to determine who falls within the definition. 66 Congress essentially pub-
lishes a list of such positions every four years, and that government officials are
currently required, if asked, to identify whether they are covered by the LDA or
not.26 It is true that unlike the term "legislation," it is not intuitively obvious
who is a covered government official under the LDA because of the complexi-
ties of the federal job classification system. But this administrative problem
could be easily overcome by requiring an administering agency to issue a list of
all covered officials and employees on a regular basis (probably using the con-
gressional list as a starting point). The IRS would probably be best suited for
this role, both because of its insulation from political influences and its expe-
rience with producing regularly updated guidance in a timely fashion. 68
The tax law definition of lobbying raises a significant issue if extended to
governments other than the federal government. Namely, the issue is which ex-
ecutive branch officials will be included in the definition. This is hard to resolve
given the variations among state, local, and non-U.S. governments. It was in
part because of such variations that Congress chose to completely exempt advo-
cacy at the local level from the definition of lobbying for business expenses de-
duction purposes.26 9
C. Which Actors?
Most of the research previously summarized focuses on the federal gov-
ernment. z7 The LDA and federal restrictions on lobbyists also only apply at the
265. See supra Subsection II.A.4, Section II.C.
266. See supra notes 1o8 and accompanying text.
267. See 2 U.S.C. § 16o9(c) (2000); POLICY POSITIONS, supra note 1o8.
268. See Mayer, supra note 18, at 671 (noting the various reasons why the IRS is rela-
tively insulated from partisan political influences); see, e.g., 2007-1 I.R.B. (includ-
ing eight detailed revenue procedures that the IRS updates on a yearly basis).
269. See supra note 138.
270. For exceptions, see, for example, Pranab Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee, Capture
and Governance at Local and National Levels, 90 AM. EcoN. REv. 135 (2000) (at-
tempting to assess "the relative susceptibility of national and local governments to
interest-group capture"); and JEFFREY M. BERRY ET AL., POWER AND INTEREST
GROUPS IN CITY POLITICS (20o6), http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/rappaport/down-
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federal level since the states have their own disclosure requirements and rules
limiting interactions with lobbyists'7 It is therefore appropriate to start with
that level of government and attempts to influence those actors who should be
encompassed within the definition of lobbying.
1. Which Federal Government Actors?
There are several methods that interest groups may use to influence gov-
ernment actors to prefer the interests of those groups over the more general
public interest without significant offsetting benefits to the government deci-
sion making process."' Looking at the activities of interest groups and their
lobbyists in this fashion reveals some easy choices. Members of Congress and
their staffs are most vulnerable to the problematic methods because of their re-
liance on reelection, the often temporary nature of their government service,273
and their ability to have closed door meetings with lobbyists that protect the in-
formation they receive from outside scrutiny. While certain methods of influ-
ence, such as providing gifts or outright bribery, have been foreclosed or sharp-
ly limited, these rules do not extend to these other methods. Attempts to
influence their actions should therefore usually be considered lobbying.
At the other extreme, federal judges and their staffs are for the most part
not vulnerable to these problematic methods. Judges are not elected, and they
and their staffs usually do not depart for post-government service positions. 7 4
One significant exception are the law clerks hired for a year or two of service by
most federal judges, but there is no evidence that these usually newly minted
lawyers have been compromised by post-clerk employment offers. The reason
for this lack may be the significant institutional limitations on the judiciary.
Judges are limited by judicial canons that emphasize actual and perceived im-
partiality and are restricted by procedural rules that sharply limit ex parte con-
loads/berry-interest-groups.pdf (focusing on capture at the local level, using re-
search on eight cities in eastern Massachusetts).
271. See generally PETER C. CHRISTIANSON ET AL., LOBBYING, PACs, AND CAMPAIGN
FINANCE: 50 STATE HANDBOOK (2007) (providing a comprehensive and detailed
overview of both lobbying and campaign finance laws in all fifty states, as well as
at the federal level).
272. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. But see supra note 212 and accompany-
ing text (presenting contrasting methods such as providing accurate information
to government actors, gathering information about government actions that can
be shared with the group's members and the public as a whole, and providing a
vehicle through which the group's members and other individuals can participate
in the political process along with other affected interest groups).
273. Although for some members of Congress this incentive is lessened because they
are able to retain their seats for many years.
274. See supra Subsection II.A.3.
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tacts and expose information they receive to the typically intense scrutiny of an
opposing party and its lawyers. While there may be a few avenues for problem-
atic interest group influence, such as the process by which federal judges are ini-
tially selected for nomination, the interest of a particular judge in being elevated
to the next level, or the funding of judicial conferences in pleasant locales, none
of these avenues has been demonstrated to have a significant effect on federal
judicial decisions.275 For these reasons, attempts to influence judges and their
staffs should not be included within the definition of lobbying.
The extent to which the definition of lobbying should include attempts to
influence executive branch officials and employees, which for these purposes
would include officials and employees of independent agencies as well as the
President, Vice President, and all who report directly or indirectly to them, is a
more difficult question. Most of the research has indicated that government ac-
tors in the executive branch have many of the same vulnerabilities as govern-
ment actors in the legislative branch, including: reelection concerns (for the
President, Vice President, and their successors, most immediately); the need for
post-government service employment (a particularly strong concern given the
limited tenure of any given President and Vice President); and the ability to
meet behind closed doors with interest group representatives7 6 But such re-
search has focused in large part on the higher-level officials, and at least some
researchers have noted (albeit with limited or no empirical evidence) that career
civil servants may have different motivations and so may be less vulnerable to
the more problematic interest group methods.2 7
More specifically, career civil servants are insulated to a significant extent
from reelection concerns (and indeed are legally prohibited from engaging in
partisan politics).27 s Even motivations that may be subject to indirect influence
through legislative branch actors or higher level executive branch actors, such as
a desire for a larger discretionary budget or greater authority, may be limited or
non-existent for most career civil servants because they do not control a par-
275. But see Calabresi, supra note 16o, at 6o-62 (arguing that most federal judges are, in
fact, accountable in some way to a local political base); Douglas T. Kendall & Ja-
son C. Rylander, Tainted Justice: How Private Judicial Trips Undermine Public
Confidence in the Judiciary, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 65 (2004) (arguing that such
trips at least create an appearance of impropriety). Judges are also already re-
quired to disclose the receipt of gifts and reimbursements exceeding $250 that
were paid for by private organizations. See Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)).
276. See supra notes 169-173 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. This conclusion assumes that such
lower-level executive branch officials are sufficiently deterred by anti-bribery and
similar statutes so as not to be vulnerable to most blatant appeals to personal self-
interest. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
278. See 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 7321-7326 (West 2007) (sharply limiting the political activities of
executive branch employees). This is commonly known as the Hatch Act.
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ticular budget that is set by such other government actors and more authority
can easily translate into more work and distraction from the core mission, and
so may not be desired.7 9
There are also institutional constraints on the extent to which interest
groups can influence career civil servants other than through providing infor-
mation in a public-and therefore verifiable-manner. These include the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act and other procedural rules and practices, as well as a
general culture that promotes appearing neutral."' ° These are in addition to the
legal prohibitions on partisan political activity already and, of course, the pro-
hibitions or sharp limits on the ability to receive financial or other personal fa-
vors.
81
The data on the differences between executive branch actors are limited.
But for all of the reasons just stated, it appears that it would be reasonable to
distinguish career civil servants from other, higher-level executive branch ac-
tors, with attempts to influence the former not being considered lobbying while
attempts to influence the latter would. The LDA already makes exactly this dis-
tinction on account of the perception that these high-level executive branch of-
ficials are more susceptible to interest group influence. It would be reasonable
and consistent to adopt that distinction for tax purposes as well.282
2. Which State, Local, and Foreign Government Actors?
The LDA's detailed line drawing for executive branch actors does not, how-
ever, address where the line should be drawn in the tax rules for state, local, and
foreign government actors. Turning first to state and local governments, there
are again some simple choices. There is no reason to believe that state legisla-
tures, elected state executive branch officials and their immediate staffs, and
elected officials and their immediate staffs at the local level, are any less vulner-
able than federal elected officials to the problematic interest group influence
methods already identified.28 3 Attempts to influence such government actors
should therefore be included in the definition of lobbying.
279. See supra note 18o and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
283. It is often more difficult to distinguish at the local level between a "legislative
branch" official and an "executive branch" official, particularly since local gov-
ernments often are not cleanly divided into two such branches. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R.
§ 56.4 911-2(d)(4) (2007) (defining administrative (i.e., executive branch) bodies as
including "school boards, housing authorities, sewer and water districts, zoning
boards, and other similar ... special purpose bodies, whether elective or appoint-
ive"); Avakian-Martin, supra note 138, at (reporting a congressional staffer's ex-
planation that Congress chose not to deny a business expense deduction for ex-
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Judges at the state and local levels make for a more problematic compari-
son to the federal judges, however, since many of them are elected. The poten-
tial effects on their decision-making from having to raise campaign funds and
solicit votes have been extensively discussed by others. s4 Not surprisingly, these
discussions indicate at least a potential for influence through means similar to
those found problematic for legislative and executive branch elected officials,
particularly through the provision of campaign contributions and other reelec-
tion aid and through the possibility of lucrative post-government service em-
ployment. At the same time, however, state and local judges are subject to much
the same type of institutional restraints as federal judges, including legal re-
quirements to be-and appear to be-impartial and sharp limitations on ex
parte contacts. Also, for the most part, they are limited to deciding specific cases
and controversies, although their decisions, and particularly those of the higher
courts, can establish precedents that affect many individuals and entities be-
yond the parties in front for the court.
These factors make it a closer call with state and local judges than with fed-
eral judges. However, both the institutional limitations on state and local judges
and the necessarily public nature of cases brought before them arguably tilt the
balance toward excluding attempts to influence them-which are primarily
through litigation-from the definition of lobbying. The administrative con-
penditures for attempts to influence the actions of local officials because of the
difficulty of determining whether such action related to "legislation"). For this
reason, I will refer to local elected officials generally without distinguishing be-
tween legislative and executive branch officials.
284. See, e.g., James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts:
Legitimacy Theory and "New-Style" Judicial Campaigns, 102 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 59
(2008) (concluding, based on survey data, that campaign contributions and elec-
tion-related attack ads lead to a reduction in the perceived legitimacy of state
courts with elected judges, although policy pronouncements made during cam-
paigns do not have this effect); David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 1o8
COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (concluding that as judicial elections have
come to resemble other candidate elections, they also have become more subject
to political influence, including the influence of interest groups); Margaret S. Wil-
liams & Corey A. Ditslear, Bidding for Justice: The Influence of Attorneys' Contribu-
tions on State Supreme Courts, 28 JusT. Svs. J. 135, 135 (2007) (finding little evi-
dence of "a systematic relationship between attorneys' campaign contributions
and the votes" of elected Wisconsin judges, but also finding evidence suggesting
that "some individual judges may be influenced"); Stephen I. Choi et al., Profes-
sionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Ap-
pointed Judiciary (Univ. of Chicago Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 357,
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1oo8989
(concluding that the available empirical evidence does not support the common
view that elected judges are more vulnerable to political pressures than appointed
judges). See generally RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL,
AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007) (describ-
ing the current state of judicial elections, including proposed reforms).
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venience of having a consistent definition at the federal, state, and local levels
also weighs, at least in a minor way, toward excluding such attempts from the
definition.
Making distinctions among those who report, directly or indirectly, to
elected state executive branch officials and elected local officials is more diffi-
cult, however.28 Probably for this reason Congress chose not to extend the
"covered executive branch official" concept to state and local officials (even
elected ones) when it chose to deny a business expenses deduction for expendi-
tures for attempts to influence the official actions or positions of such offi-
cials." 6 To attempt to draw a line between "career civil servants" and those who
are not for all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and all localities ultimately
would be a mammoth undertaking and practically impossible to comply with
and enforce.
Using some type of distinction between government officials with protec-
tions "similar to" those enjoyed by federal career civil servants and others
would also introduce significant uncertainty into the definition, which could
lead to confusion and possibly a significant chilling effect on charities contact-
ing state executive branch and local officials. The existing rules for charities-
and particularly the vague definition of lobbying that applies to most chari-
ties-have almost certainly had a chilling effect on their participation in public
policy debates.2i7 For example, a recent survey of charity executives found that
almost thirty percent of them did not know they could (albeit to a limited ex-
tent) support or oppose federal legislation at all."' It was in large part for this
reason that Congress created the optional, elective regime for measuring the
permitted amount of lobbying by public charities."9
For this reason, the tax definition of lobbying should only extend to at-
tempts to influence the official acts or positions of elected officials. To prevent
285. Elected state legislatures usually have staffs whose very employment depends on
the reelection of particular legislators and pleasing those legislators, so it is an easy
call to say that attempts to influence state legislative staffs as well as state legisla-
tors should be included within the definition of lobbying.
286. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 162(e)(1)(D), 162(e)(6) (2000) (including only federal officials
within the definition of a "covered executive branch official").
287. JEFFREY M. BERRY & DAVID F. ARONs, A VOICE FOR NONPROFITS 60-65 (2003)
(citing evidence strongly supporting this point); see also Berry, supra note 195, at
22-28 (reiterating and expanding on this point).
288. TUFTS UNIV. ET AL., SNAP: STRENGTHENING NONPROFIT ADVOCACY PROJECT:
OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS 54-56 (2002), http://www.ombwatch.org/snap [hereinaf-
ter SNAP SURVEY]; see also GARY D. BASS ET AL., SEEN BUT NOT HEARD:
STRENGTHENING NONPROFIT ADVOCACY 35-37, 174-81 (2007) (discussing the re-
sults of the SNAP SURVEY, which indicate that confusion about the existing tax
laws deters many charities from engaging in permitted advocacy and lobbying).
289. BERRY & ARONS, supra note 287, at 64-65.
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circumvention of this rule, however, the definition should also include indirect
attempts to influence such actions by contacting other government officials.
Without this latter provision, it would be relatively easy for interest groups to
have a closed door meeting with an appointed executive branch official who
would then, at the group's request, communicate whatever information was
provided in that meeting-whether accurate or not, and possibly including in-
dications of reelection aid or post-government service employment-to the
elected official (legislative or executive) with the authority to act on the request.
Even with this latter provision an interest group's attempts to influence an ap-
pointed elected official with regard to that official's own duties or positions
would not be captured, but given the line drawing difficulty already discussed
the only practical way to avoid this underinclusion would probably be to in-
clude all attempts to influence state executive branch and local government of-
ficials and employees, which would almost certainly be highly overinclusive.
Given that the effectiveness of the tax rules in curtailing interest group use of
problematic methods is unclear (although assumed for purposes of this article),
it is probably better to be underinclusive rather than overinclusive in this situa-
tion.
For foreign government actors somewhat different considerations apply.
The IRS has made it clear that under the current definition of lobbying, seeking
to influence the official duties of such actors can fall within the various tax
rules, at least with respect to charities.2 9 But the reality is that given the enor-
mous variety of foreign government structures and centers of political power
(for example, in many European countries political parties are often the key de-
cision makers, not individual elected officials), and the interests those govern-
ments have in regulating advocacy directed at their own government's actions
(and the lesser U.S. interest in regulating such advocacy as compared to advo-
cacy directed at U.S. governmental actors or actions), a simple, easy-to-
administer definition is probably preferable to trying to create a fine-tuned but
complicated definition. For this reason, a similar definition as used for state and
local governments would be appropriate-attempts to influence legislators,
their staffs, and other elected officials besides judges with respect to their official
duties or positions-but with an express caveat that for foreign governments
the determination of whether a particular government official or employee falls
within the definition would only need to be reasonable and made in good faith
to be accepted. Such a provision should limit the burden on both taxpayers and
the IRS in administering the tax rules regarding lobbying. An even simpler al-
ternative would be to exclude attempts to influence foreign government actors
from the definition of lobbying-which may be effectively the rule many if not
most businesses and charities currently follow given the relative obscurity of the
290. See Rev. Rul. 73-440, 1973-2 C.B. 177-78 (including action by foreign legislative bo-
dies within the definition of legislation for charities).
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tax ruling extending the definition of lobbying to reach advocacy directed at
foreign governments.2 9'
D. What About the Grassroots?
There is one other major decision regarding the scope of the lobbying defi-
nition that needs to be addressed before turning to possible exceptions. Interest
groups do not try to influence government actors only by direct contacts. They
also use indirect or grassroots lobbying-the long-standing tactic of encouraging
members of the public who are sympathetic with the group's positions and part
of the actor's constituency to contact the actor themselves.2 92 Interest groups
also engage in less targeted efforts to modify public opinion on issues relating to
possible future government action, although such efforts can be difficult to dis-
tinguish from more general commercial advertising and public education. 93
291. The extension of these rules to attempts to influence foreign government legisla-
tion is only found in a single Revenue Ruling from 1973 relating to charities. Id.
Even though that ruling has been cited in various informal IRS documents, it is
unlikely that most charities are aware of it. See, e.g., Kindell & Reilly, supra note 31,
at 272 (briefly describing this ruling). At least one commentator has also argued
for relaxing the lobbying limitation for charities because that limitation inhibits
efforts to promote democracy in other countries. Nina J. Crimm, Democratiza-
tion, Global Grant-Making, and the Internal Revenue Code Lobbying Restrictions, 79
TUL. L. REv. 587 (2005).
292. See HERRING, supra note 3, at 7 ("Man has ... always sought to advance his cause
by alliance with like-minded fellows."); id. at 59 (noting that the first and most
important function of any lobbying group is to dispense "propaganda" to the
public); Logan & Patten, supra note 3, at 61-62 (noting that legislators are likely to
be swayed by communications from their constituents, even when it is apparent
that those communications were prompted by a lobbyist's instigation); id. at 64-
65 (molding public opinion generally); id. at 83-85 (concerns regarding grassroots
activities). For early examples, see Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498
(1959); Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Comm'r, 314 U.S. 326 (1941); and Logan &
Patten, supra note 3, at 9. For recent examples of such efforts, see BERRY & WIL-
COX, supra note 2, at 113-18; and KOLLMAN, supra note 161, at 25 (noting that while
policy preferences among the public remain fairly static, the salience of issues to
voters can change frequently and rapidly, and that lobbyists can help to effect
such changes in issue salience).
293. See HERRING, supra note 3, at 61 (noting that even a journal sent by an association
to its members can serve as effective lobbying material); KOLLMAN, supra note 161,
at 37 (noting that half of surveyed interest groups advertise in some form and that
one fourth hold press conferences on occasion); Logan & Patten, supra note 3, at
61-62 (noting that, as lobbyists refine their tactics, "it will become increasingly dif-
ficult for legislators to distinguish a manufactured [public] sentiment from a real
one").
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Perhaps for this reason, to the extent rules governing lobbying have reached
such activities they have only extended to efforts clearly tied to legislation. 94
Several commentators have argued for grassroots lobbying to be included
in the definition of lobbying, either for purposes of the disclosure rules or for
purposes of the tax rules.2 95 These commentators advance various arguments
for including grassroots lobbying within the reach of the disclosure rules. One
argument is that such disclosure will better inform competing interest groups
about these activities, and so lead to greater and more equally matched interest
group competition.29 6 Another argument is that such disclosure will expose so-
called "astroturf" campaigns, where an interest group generates fake or at least
short-lived and shallow public support for its position through sophisticated
marketing techniques. 97 Such campaigns could also create the false impression
that many members of the electorate may vote against the targeted legislator
unless he or she supports their position. A third argument is that the primary
benefit of lobbying is the provision of useful information to government deci-
sion makers, and that benefit can readily and more easily be provided through
direct lobbying29' Grassroots lobbying in contrast, it is argued, provides no
more information than that an interest group could provide more easily
through direct lobbying. 99
The problem with these arguments is that they assume grassroots lobbying
presents a risk of harm to the democratic process that is equal to some of the
direct lobbying techniques discussed previously while at the same time having
minimal offsetting benefits. If that were the case, then the administrative bur-
den and potential chilling effect of including such efforts within the definition
294. See I.R.C. § 162(e)(1)(C) (2000) (reaching attempts to influence the public "with
respect to ... legislative matters[] or referendums"); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2o(b)(2)
(as amended in 1995) (including in lobbying seeking to influence legislators indi-
rectly "by urging or encouraging the public to contact [legislators] for the purpose
of proposing, supporting, or opposing legislation"); Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-
2(b)(2)(ii) (1990) (defining grassroots lobbying as only including communica-
tions that refer to specific legislation, reflect a view on such legislation, and en-
courage the recipient to take action with respect to such legislation).
295. E.g., Galston, supra note io, at 1338-1343 (tax rules); Krishnakumar, supra note io,
at 548-51 (disclosure rules); Luneburg & Susman, supra note lo, at 44-46 (disclo-
sure rules).
296. Krishnakumar, supra note io, at 548-51.
297. Luneburg & Susman, supra note lo, at 44-46; see also KOLLMAN, supra note 16l, at
157-6o (arguing that "astroturf" lobbying is only a concern where both the popu-
larity and salience (intensity of support) of a policy are low, in which case the lob-
bying effort can result in a least a temporary misleading impression of public sup-
port).
298. Galston, supra note 1o, at 1339.
299. Id. at 1348.
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of lobbying for one or all of the applicable rules might be appropriate. But nei-
ther of these assumptions appears to be correct.
First, the two screens that any grassroots lobbying effort must pass through
in order to influence government actors limits its effectiveness. The initial
screen is that a sufficient number of members of the public must be convinced
that the issue at stake is a significant enough concern to them personally that it
is worth taking the time to communicate the interest group's position to the
relevant government officials. While savvy marketing may almost always gener-
ate some response, it would be presumptuous to assume that a significant re-
sponse could be obtained without the influenced members of the public at least
agreeing to some extent with the interest group's position and agreeing strongly
enough to respond to the request for action.300 It would appear that it is for this
reason that grassroots lobbying is more of a preferred technique for interest
groups that have large, committed memberships who can be relied upon to re-
spond to a grassroots lobbying request because they usually agree with the
group's positions."' The other screen is the government actors themselves, who
are undoubtedly well aware of the long-standing practice of generating appar-
ent grassroots support for an interest group's position.30 2 Probably for these rea-
son, many government actors appear to significantly discount the results of
grassroots lobbying efforts which appear to be primarily organized by a central
organization and not have required much effort by the individual members of
300. See BERRY & WILCOX, supra note 2, at 118 (noting that even so-called "astroturf"
campaigns rely in large part on identifying sympathetic citizens, even if those citi-
zens are not longstanding members of a particular interest group); FARBER &
FRICKEY, supra note 29, at 82 (noting problems with assuming voters are con-
stantly fooled); Shaviro, supra note 200, at 49-50, 56; Troyer, supra note 139, at
803. But see Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U.
PA. L. REV. 129 (2003) (arguing that individuals are much more influenced by
their situations, including marketing efforts, than is commonly acknowledged).
301. See KOLLMAN, supra note 16l, at loo (noting "strong empirical support" that in-
terest groups generally only use grassroots lobbying when the group's position
corresponds to public preferences, although strength of support is more impor-
tant than overall popularity because well targeted grassroots lobbying can rely on
intense supporters of an otherwise unpopular policy); id. at 158 (concluding that
grassroots lobbying is relatively rare when both popularity and salience (intensity
of support) for a policy are low, which are the conditions where such lobbying is
mostly likely to create an incorrect impression of public support).
302. See BERRY & WILCOX, supra note 2, at 116 ("Of course, policymakers know that
these communications are coordinated and that interest groups have spent time
and money to encourage their members to be active."); sources cited supra note
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the public. 3 Indeed, it is the fact that elected government officials serve as fil-
ters for the transformation of public opinion into government actions that most
scholars have cited as one of the primary reasons why our current constitutional
structure is resistant to interest groups . 4 Government officials may also be able
to check on the relative support and perhaps even salience of a particular issue
by looking to other sources such as opinion polls, if given sufficient time. It is
true that the growth of electronic communications has almost certainly reduced
the time and effort required by individuals to respond to a grassroots lobbying
appeal by contacting their representatives. But even assuming the response rate
to such appeals has significantly increased, it is still likely that government ac-
tors are able to differentiate between mere electronic forwarding of a form mes-
sage written by a central organization and more personalized messages that rep-
resent a greater level of commitment to an issue or position, and to assign
different weights to the communications they receive as a result.
Second, grassroots lobbying efforts often provide two significant benefits.
Such efforts may keep the public informed about pending government actions,
thereby increasing the transparency of government." 5 Perhaps just as impor-
tantly, such efforts may stimulate the provision of information to government
actors that they may otherwise lack-at a minimum, such efforts reveal that an
interest group is willing to spend significant resources to support a particular
position." 6 The ability of grassroots lobbying to provide inaccurate informa-
tion-to the public and, through them, to government officials-is also tem-
pered by its relatively public nature and therefore exposure to scrutiny by com-
peting interest groups, the media, and the public.
Given these benefits and the limited ability of grassroots lobbying to influ-
ence government actors to choose the interests of a particular interest group
over the public interest, grassroots lobbying should not be included within the
303. KOLLMAN, supra note 161, at 73-75 (citing research indicating that members of
Congress are much less responsive to constituent communications that appear to
be highly orchestrated by a central organization).
304. See Reynolds, supra note 21o, at 1649-51 (arguing that this intermediary role served
by elected public officials provides resistance to both minority and majority tyr-
anny, in contrast to direct popular democracy that would open the door to major-
ity tyranny).
305. See BERRY & WILCOX, supra note 2, at 6-8 (noting that interest groups contribute
to government transparency in six key ways: representing constituents, increasing
public participation, educating the public, framing political issues, building legis-
lative agendas, and monitoring programs already implemented).
306. See id. at 116 (noting that grassroots lobbying efforts provide important signals
about an interest group's commitment to a given position); KOLLMAN, supra note
161, at 155 (concluding that it appears grassroots lobbying by interest groups "of-
ten communicates real content about public opinion to policymakers"); MACEDO,
supra note 21z, at 12 (arguing that for many issues citizens may provide expertise
that government actors lack).
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single definition of lobbying. This would be a significant change for the tax
rules, which have always reached grassroots lobbying (the LDA and its prede-
cessor have never reached grassroots lobbying and recent efforts to extend the
LDA in this fashion have fallen short). But its effects would probably be less far-
reaching than might be expected for two reasons. First, businesses may spend
what they deem advisable to spend on lobbying, including grassroots lobbying,
regardless of the tax consequences because the potential costs of legislation or
other government actions heavily outweigh any possible tax costs. Second, for
charities and private foundations grassroots lobbying is currently defined so
narrowly that it is relatively easy to engage in "public opinion" campaigns that
carefully avoid falling within that definition by, for example, simply excluding a
"call to action" that would either explicitly ask or strongly suggest that the tar-
get of the communication contact a government official.0 7 But even if the effect
is significant, inhibiting grassroots lobbying either through taxing it or disclos-
ing it does not appear justified. It should therefore not fall within the definition
of lobbying.
Similar considerations argue, although not as strongly, for excluding at-
tempts to influence the public with respect to ballot initiatives, referenda, and
other voter-determined lawmaking. While such attempts lack the double-filter
of public and government actor-the voters being in effect the legislature-the
public nature of such attempts both encourage public involvement in political
decision making and expose such attempts to scrutiny by opponents, the media,
and the public. They therefore arguably have more in common with grassroots
lobbying than direct lobbying of government actors who be misled by privately
provided inaccurate information or enticed by promises of electoral support or
other benefits.
E. Exceptions
This section will not try to develop all of the possible exceptions in detail-
which could be an article in itself-but will instead provide general guidelines
for the types of exceptions that should exist. Broadly speaking, the current defi-
nitions provide three types of exceptions: communications to government ac-
tors and the public with characteristics that make them likely to be accurate,
such as testifying before a congressional committee or publishing a widely dis-
tributed analytical report; communications that facilitate internal communica-
tions or protect the survival of charities; and administrative convenience excep-
307. See Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(b)(2) (199o) (providing that a communication will only
qualify as a grassroots lobbying communication if it includes: a specific request to
contact a legislator or legislative branch employee; contact information for such a
person; a petition or tear-off postcard to communicate with such a person; or
specific identification of one or more legislators as linked them in some way to the
legislation at issue or as the recipient's representative).
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tions.3° Differences between the exceptions provided by the various sets of rules
appear to be driven by two considerations: differences in the general definition
of lobbying, such as the fact that the LDA does not reach any communications
with the public so no LDA exceptions are needed relating to such communica-
tions; and a bias in favor of charities in the tax rules. The first set of differences
become unnecessary if Congress adopts a single definition of lobbying, as this
article proposes. The second set of differences suggests that perhaps the excep-
tions should differ for charities as opposed to for business. But before turning
to that issue, we should address the question of what exceptions should exist for
all types of groups.
These existing exceptions, when combined with the earlier discussion of in-
terest group influence, suggest that several categories of exceptions should exist
to the proposed single definition of lobbying. First, there should be a set of ex-
ceptions for communications to covered government actors that are done in a
setting that exposes such communications to scrutiny by competing interest
groups, the media, and the public, thereby deterring the provision of both inac-
curate information and explicit or implicit promises of non-informational aid
(e.g., campaign contributions). Such exceptions might include, for example,
public testimony, publicly available comments submitted in response to a pub-
lic request for comments, and participation on government advisory commit-
tees.3 °9
Second, with the tax rules now having a definition based on the govern-
ment actor, not the government action, there should be a common set of excep-
tions for communications relating to proceedings that only affect a specific en-
tity or individual, that are subject to confidentiality requirements, or that are
part of a congressionally recognized private-public relationship, such as exist in
the LDA. Such exceptions might include communications that are part of a law
enforcement or congressional investigation, communications that are part of a
whistleblower complaint protected by law, communications that are required
by law to be kept confidential, agency adjudications, and personnel matters for
specific individuals. 10
Third, there should be some exceptions to recognize situations where the
administrative burden of tracking lobbying activity is considered excessive.
These exceptions might include de minimis exceptions, for example. 11 Com-
munications with foreign government actors might also be included among
these exceptions (for tax law purposes), for the reasons already discussed."2
308. See supra Subsection I.C.4.
309. See supra notes 128-13o and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 128.
311. See supra note 140.
312. See supra notes 290-291 and accompanying text.
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Finally, there should be an exception to clarify that communications with
the public-which are not covered by the proposed single definition of lobby-
ing-are not swept into the definition of lobbying by virtue of the fact that they
reach a covered government actor in that actor's capacity as a member of the
public. For example, if a group sends out a large-scale direct mailing that hap-
pens to include a member of Congress, that fact should not transform the entire
mailing into lobbying (or even the single letter that happens to reach the mem-
ber, although a de minimis exception would probably cover that eventuality).
That leaves the question of whether there should be any differences in the
exceptions provided because of differences between types of interest groups.
The bias in favor of charities noted above probably arises from the fact signifi-
candy stricter rules apply to charities as compared to the rules that apply to
businesses. The charity rules limit lobbying to no more than an insubstantial
activity and completely prohibit lobbying for private foundations, and impose
the possible draconian sanction of revocation of tax-exempt status. The rules
for businesses do not limit the amount of lobbying at all but only deny a deduc-
tion for lobbying expenditures, and impose at worst interest and penalties on a
business that deducts its lobbying expenditures in violation of this rule. Given
the stricter rules for charities, Congress may have wanted them to have access to
a larger range of exceptions. The difference may also be driven by a congres-
sional determination that charities are more likely to be sources of accurate in-
formation, or of some combination of these two reasons.313
The fact that charities are subject to the strictest rules under the tax laws ar-
gues for maintaining the tax law exclusions only available to charities for so-
called self-defense lobbying and membership communications. 3 14 The more dif-
ficult question is whether charities should have a broader set of information-
providing exceptions either because they face stricter rules, because they are
more likely to provide accurate information given their public interest nature,
or because they may speak for groups that otherwise lack access to the political
process. 315 While this is a closer call, it would appear that for all of these reasons
the existing exception for providing nonpartisan research should be continued
for charities but not provided to other types of interest groups. 3' 6
313. See supra notes 141 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 134-135.
315. See Troyer, supra note 139, at 8Ol-02 (noting that Congress defined lobbying much
more broadly for businesses than for charities so that more business activities
would be caught by the language, making it relatively easier for charities to advo-
cate safely outside the definition's scope).
316. See supra note 128.
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CONCLUSION
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the definitional changes pro-
posed here. While in most respect the LDA definition of lobbying, and therefore
the definition of who is a registered lobbyist, would not change significantly, the
tax definitions would be radically altered. This in turn would have an effect on
the LDA and the lobbyist restrictions.
The biggest effect would be on charities. They would face both an expanded
and contracted definition of lobbying for purposes of the limitation on lobby-
ing to an insubstantial amount."' The definition would be expanded because it
would now include not only attempts to influence legislation, but also all at-
tempts to influence the official actions or positions of legislative officials and
employees and a large group of senior executive branch officials. The definition
would at the same time be significantly contracted, however, because it would
no longer reach any attempts to influence the public, including grassroots lob-
bying. Business would experience a similar change, although their tax definition
of lobbying includes attempts to influence a limited set of very senior executive
branch officials, and they are not, of course, limited in their amount of lobby-
ing, but only limited with respect to their ability to deduct their lobbying ex-
penditures.
This change in tax definition would also have a ripple effect on the LDA
and the rules restricting lobbyists. With only minor differences between the tax
definition and the LDA definition as they applied to federal lobbying-relating
to specific tax exceptions for charities-there would be no significant justifica-
tion to give entities the option of using the tax definition for LDA purposes. All
organizations would therefore be reporting information under the same defini-
tion of lobbying under the LDA, and all individuals who had to register as lob-
byists because of that definition would be subject to the restrictions on regis-
tered lobbyists. Thus the apples and oranges problem created by the current
ability of organizations to select which definition to use for LDA purposes
would be eliminated, allowing both more accurate and more easy to compare
reporting?' A single definition also has the benefit of reducing the administra-
tive burden on those subject to these laws.
As importantly, this review reveals that long-standing legal rules need to be
tested against current research results and viewed in the context of the universe
of legal rules that affect the same behavior. When Congress and the Treasury
Department initially defined lobbying they did not have the benefit of the now-
decades of research into how interest groups influence government actions and
how government functions. Slowly the results of that research crept into the
law, particularly with respect to the LDA, but only in a haphazard and inconsis-
317. And for private foundations, for purposes of the prohibition on their lobbying.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
318. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
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tent fashion, as demonstrated by the default definition of lobbying for charities
being essentially unchanged since 1934. At the same time, most examinations of
these rules have focused on only one or two sets of restrictions, ignoring the to-
tality of the federal laws governing lobbying and, therefore, both the adminis-
trative burdens and the potential for regulatory arbitrage created by differences
between them.
This examination of the definition of lobbying is therefore only one exam-
ple of how review of both up-to-date information and rules from multiple sub-
stantive areas can lead to important insights regarding how legal rules should be
changed to best accomplish their purposes currently and into the future. Ex-
amination of a particular statute or other legal rule can still provide valuable in-
sights, but when the ultimate goal is to determine whether particular activities
of a regulated community are likely to be changed in the desired direction by a
particular legal rule, it is necessary to examine all of the legal rules that have a
significant effect those activities. Failure to do so can lead to inconsistencies,
loopholes and even contradictory incentives or disincentives. Other possible ex-
amples of where this approach could be useful include the previously cited case
of looking at how all applicable environmental laws affect the use of a particular
property or environmental resource,319 examining both the election law and the
tax rules that regulate election-related activities,32 ° and exploring how both tax
and applicable non-tax laws, such as real property laws, influence charitable
contributions.32' While such an analysis is more difficult from a scholarly per-
spective because it requires understanding multiple bodies of laws and their in-
teractions, it potentially is highly rewarding because it can expose unnecessary
or even harmful inconsistencies, as occurred here.
319. See supra note 12.
320. For examples, see Mayer, supra note 18, and the articles cited in that article, id. at
628 n.12, which all discuss the combined effect of election laws and tax laws on
"527 groups.
321. See, e.g., Danaya C. Wright & Scott A. Bowman, Charitable Deductions for Rail-
Trail Conversions: Reconciling the Partial Interest Rule and the National Trails Sys-
tem Act, 32 WM. & MARY. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. (forthcoming 20o8), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract-id=io8l6 55.
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